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THE MAJORITY-VOTING MOVEMENT: 
CURTAILING SHAREHOLDER 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN CORPORATE 
DIRECTOR ELECTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The term “corporate governance” means simply “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled.”1 But the contours of the topic are 
much more complicated.2 A fundamental debate among corporate-
governance commentators is the extent to which shareholders should 
participate in the process.3 This debate has continued since 1933, when 
Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardinier C. Means’s famous book, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, predicted the problems inherent in the 
control structure of the corporation—where investors provide capital to 
corporations and get virtually no say in how that capital is employed.4 
The inability of shareholders to dictate the corporate business decisions 
is a necessary feature of the modern publicly traded corporation.5 The 
thousands of dispersed shareholders that make up the public corporation’s 
investing populace cannot come together to make its business decisions.6 
Therefore, its management must lie in a centralized group; that group is 
the board of directors.7 Directors, acting as a board, are empowered under 
state law to make corporate decisions8 and all the while must keep the 
interest of the corporation—and thereby also its shareholders—foremost in 
their collective mind.9  
 
 
 1. Adrian Cadbury & Ira M. Millstein, The New Agenda for ICGN, in 3 ANNUAL DIRECTORS’ 
INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 673, 686 (2005) (citation omitted). Corporate governance 
generally refers to “making sure the business is run well.” Judith Burns, Everything You Wanted to 
Know About Corporate Governance . . . But Didn’t Know to Ask, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R6. 
 2. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Joann S. Lublin, Voting Rights: Democracy Looks for an 
Opening, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2004, at A1. 
 3. Compare ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINIER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6–7 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932) (noting the concern that 
shareholders were unable to exercise control over corporate managers), with Stephen A. Bainbridge, 
The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 622–28 (2006) (arguing that 
limited shareholder involvement is necessary for public corporations to function).  
 4. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
 5. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 622–28. 
 6. See id. at 623. This Note discusses publicly traded corporations only. See infra note 34. 
 7. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 624–25. 
 8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2006). 
 9. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 258–59 (Del. 2000); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939). 
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Nevertheless, individual directors can deviate from their legal duties.10 
Thus, in order to effectively safeguard their investment, shareholders must 
have access to an accountability mechanism.11 The fundamental 
mechanism under state law is the power of shareholders to elect 
directors.12 In reality, however, shareholders have had very limited say 
over who ultimately sits on the board.13 Year after year, incumbent 
directors nominate themselves to run in the election, and shareholders, as a 
practical matter, find themselves unable to nominate anyone else.14 The 
excessive cost and significant amount of time that goes into waging a 
proxy contest—one of very few ways of challenging the incumbent 
nominees under the SEC’s proxy rules—resign shareholders to accept the 
incumbent directors as the nominees for the election.15 
The problem of shareholders’ lack of participation in the nomination of 
directors perhaps would not be as pronounced if shareholders could vote 
against those incumbents in the actual election.16 Then the board might be 
more willing to nominate candidates who are more acceptable to the 
shareholders.17 But, in the ordinary case, shareholders cannot vote against 
the board-imposed nominees either.18 Instead, shareholders have the 
choice of either casting an affirmative vote for an incumbent director (a 
“for” vote) or withholding their authority to vote (a “withhold” or 
“withheld” vote).19 Such withheld votes are not counted, however, under 
the current plurality-voting regime that exists in the majority of states, so a 
single vote received “for” an incumbent director ensures his or her 
election.20 
The SEC took note of the interaction between the proxy rules and the 
state-law voting standards and found that the effect of the regulatory 
 
 
 10. Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased Shareholder 
Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 361, 379–80 (2005) 
(providing examples of directors’ breaches of their fiduciary duties).  
 11. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 627. 
 12. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW 43, 44 
(2003).  
 13. Id. at 45. 
 14. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 391. 
 15. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians 
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 914–15 (1993). 
 16. Stephen Deane, Institutional Shareholder Services, Majority Voting in Director Elections: 
From the Symbolic to the Democratic, in WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS & LITIGATORS MUST KNOW 
ABOUT DELAWARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2006, at 331, 338 (2006). 
 17. See id. at 345. 
 18. Id. at 338.  
 19. Id. at 338–39. 
 20. See id. 
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regimes was to undermine shareholders’ ability to elect board members.21 
In an attempt to fix the problems in the election process, the SEC proposed 
the Security Holder Director Nominations Rule, which would have 
allowed shareholders, without great cost, to nominate their own 
directors.22 That rule, however, met significant opposition, and to this day 
the SEC has not adopted it.23 Disappointed but undeterred, shareholder 
activists soon noted another way to fix the election process—this time by 
looking to state law.24 They noted that, apart from the board’s domination 
in the nominating process, the other major problem with director elections 
was the inability of shareholders to vote against incumbent directors in 
uncontested elections.25 Thus began the majority-voting movement. If 
successful, the movement would cause the majority-voting standard to 
displace plurality voting as the dominant voting standard in uncontested 
director elections.26  
This Note analyzes the origins and progress of, and issues surrounding, 
the majority-voting movement. Part II of the Note provides background 
information on the function of the board of directors in corporate 
governance and the distribution of power between the board and 
shareholders under corporate law, as well as a brief description of the 
operation of the federal proxy rules. Part III traces the evolution of the 
majority-voting movement in terms of significant trends in corporate 
governance, the recent legislation and regulation enacted to curb corporate 
fraud, and the SEC’s controversial Security Holder Director Nominations 
Rule (“Shareholder Access Proposal” or “Proposed Rule”). Part IV 
discusses the majority-voting movement as it is unfolding today. Part IV 
compares and contrasts the dominant plurality-voting standard with that of 
majority voting, summarizes the corporate community’s response to the 
movement, and discusses state legislative actions and recent amendments 
to the ABA’s Revised Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) made in 
response to majority voting. Part V analyzes the problems with the 
Shareholder Access Proposal and then proceeds to enumerate the 
advantages and disadvantages of a majority-voting standard. This Part also 
thoroughly describes the implementation problems that critics of majority 
 
 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 105–08. 
 22. See infra text accompanying note 108. 
 23. Posting of Gordon Smith to Conglomerate Blog, Board Representation, http://www. 
theconglomerate.org/2006/02/board_represent.html (Feb. 5, 2006). 
 24. See Deane, supra note 16, at 338–39. 
 25. See supra text accompanying note 18; see infra note 107 and accompanying text (describing 
uncontested elections). 
 26. Deane, supra note 16, at 338, 342. 
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voting often say counsel against its adoption. Finally, Part VI concludes 
that majority voting—in its true form—is a positive corporate-governance 
development, despite detractors’ arguments, and specifically shows how 
the implementation problems can be overcome. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Importance of the Director in the Corporate-Governance System 
The main actors in the corporate-governance27 process are the 
corporation’s board of directors and senior executives, or officers.28 
Arguably, the board of directors has the single most important role in the 
corporate-governance system.29 Under the corporate laws of most states, 
including Delaware,30 the board is entrusted with the management of the 
“business and affairs” of the corporation.31 State law thus provides the 
board with the final legal say on most of the corporation’s significant 
decisions and transactions.32  
 
 
 27. “Corporate governance is the system by which we order the relations among—and functions 
of—members of a corporation’s board of directors . . . to enhance the ability of directors to properly 
discharge their duties to the corporation and its shareholders.” Felicia Smith, Corporate Governance: 
Seasoned Companies, in 33 ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 119, 125 (2001). Laws 
pertaining to the internal governance of a corporation—i.e., “corporate governance”—exist primarily 
at the state level. Id. at 128; see also Business Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d 406, 
411–12 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (listing topics and issues often encountered in corporate governance and 
stating that these are “issues traditionally governed by state law”). 
 28. Burns, supra note 1, at R6. Though the directors have the formal legal power to manage the 
corporation, it is the officers (e.g., the chief executive officer or president, secretary, and treasurer) 
who “actually run the corporation.” ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.2.1, at 105–06 
(1986). 
 29. See Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 44. 
 30. Delaware is the state of incorporation of over half of all American publicly traded S&P 500 
corporations. Deane, supra note 16, at 338. Because of its importance to state corporation law, the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) will be considered throughout the Note. In addition, the 
MBCA, promulgated by the ABA, is the model for most of the other states, id., so it will be analyzed 
throughout the Note as well. 
 31. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 376 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006)).  
 32. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 28, § 3.2.1, at 105–06 (listing the powers of the board and 
noting that “[a]s a formal legal matter, the directors . . . have extremely broad powers and 
responsibilities”). Among the board’s important powers and duties are hiring the firm’s CEO or 
president and other senior managers, setting the officers’ compensation, and replacing them if 
necessary. Id. Directors also “advise management, assist in the decision making process, improve the 
business’s operations, and assess promising business opportunities and other transactions.” 
DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 376.  
 Directors have other broad powers as well. For example, they have the power to declare whether 
there will be a dividend; determine the amount of the dividend; adopt, amend, and repeal the 
company’s bylaws; and make important operational decisions. CLARK, supra note 28, § 3.2.1, at 106. 
In practice, however, directors delegate most or all of these responsibilities to officers due to time, 
information, and budget constraints. Id. § 3.2.1, at 108. Directors may also delegate decisions to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/4











The consequence of investing such significant power and discretion in 
the hands of the board is that shareholders have very limited rights.33 To 
be sure, shareholders, consistent with their role as the “residual risk-takers 
in the capital structure,”34 do retain certain rights, such as the right to vote 
on certain corporate transactions and decisions.35 Still, these voting rights, 
which vary from state to state, are limited to only the most extraordinary 
corporate matters.36  
Despite the paradigm of vesting shareholders with very little voting 
power, shareholders have always retained one voting right that was 
supposed to be absolute: a right to vote in the election of directors.37 Since 
 
 
subcommittees of the board that they create. CLARK, supra note 28, § 3.2.1, at 106; see also Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2006). 
 Directors are responsible for initiating and approving certain “extraordinary” corporate actions, 
such as mergers, dissolutions, sales of all of the corporation’s assets, and amendments to the 
company’s charter; however, directors must also submit these important matters to the shareholders for 
their approval. CLARK, supra note 28, § 3.2.1, at 106. 
 33. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 28, § 3.1.1, at 94 (noting, in particular, that shareholders cannot 
“order the directors to follow particular business policies and practices”); Posting of Stephen 
Bainbridge to Pointoflaw.com, Corporate Governance: In Praise of the Status Quo, http://www. 
pointoflaw.com/feature/archives/002939.php (Sept. 13, 2006 16:48 EST) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Corporate Governance]. 
 34. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW 67, 79 (2003). When this Note refers to “shareholders,” it is 
generally referring to common stockholders, who ordinarily have voting rights in public companies. 
See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Listed Company Manual § 313.00 (2003). Further, this Note 
discusses director elections only in publicly traded corporations, and not in closely held or private 
corporations, as the issues surrounding shareholder voting in director elections are not as prevalent in 
the latter context. See ABA COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, DISCUSSION 
PAPER ON VOTING BY SHAREHOLDERS FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS n.6 (2005), http://www. 
abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/directorvoting/20050621000000.pdf [hereinafter ABA 
DISCUSSION PAPER]. 
 35. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 79. 
 36. CLARK, supra note 28, § 3.1.1, at 94. These extraordinary matters include sales of all the 
corporation’s assets, the decision to dissolve the corporation, and amendments to the corporate charter. 
Id. Shareholders have other voting rights (on nonoperating decisions) under state law as well, 
including: adopting, amending, or repealing the corporation’s bylaws; removing directors; and 
adopting shareholder resolutions, which may approve board actions or request that the board take 
certain actions. Id. § 3.1.1, at 94. For the general argument that vesting shareholders with limited 
power in favor of centralized management in the board of directors is necessary to the functioning of 
the public corporation, see id. § 3.1.1, at 94–95; Bainbridge, Corporate Governance, supra note 33. 
 37. See CLARK, supra note 28, § 3.1.1, at 95. Shareholders vote for directors, either in person or 
by proxy, at an annual meeting that all public corporations are required to hold. Id. § 9.1.1, at 358. In 
most companies, shareholders vote for the entire set, or slate, of directors every year at the annual 
meeting. See id. § 3.1.1, at 358. Some companies, however, have what is termed “classified” boards. In 
such companies, the board is split into different classes, and only certain classes participate in the 
shareholder vote each year. For example, Class A may be up for a shareholder vote in year 1, Class B 
in year 2, and Class C in year 3. Id. § 3.2.1, at 105. Board classification has the effect of allowing 
directors to serve for multiple years without having to face a vote each year. See id.; see also DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2006) (providing that corporations can have classified boards of directors). 
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directors are the central force in effective corporate governance, it seems 
logical to allow shareholders to vote on the election of those who “hold in 
the palms of their hands the broad trust and confidence of the 
shareholders.”38 The theory behind giving shareholders the power to vote 
directors out of office is that directors will be accountable to shareholders 
and responsive to their concerns and requests, at the peril of being 
unseated otherwise.39 
It may come as some surprise, then, to learn that in practice, 
shareholders have very little say in the nomination and election of 
directors. In fact, the notion that shareholders have the power to replace 
directors who disserve their interests is, in the words of Professor Lucian 
A. Bebchuck, “largely a myth.”40 The election of directors at the annual 
meeting of shareholders each year has been labeled a “rubber-stamping” of 
a “yes vote” for the incumbent directors who essentially nominated 
themselves.41  
B. The Federal Proxy Laws 
Before evaluating the efficacy of shareholder voting in director 
elections, however, it is necessary to understand how the federal proxy 
laws interact with the state laws on director elections. SEC Regulation 
14A, implementing section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (the Exchange Act), constitutes the federal proxy rules.42 It provides, 
inter alia, that whenever someone (whether corporation’s management or a 
 
 
 Generally, each shareholder receives one vote for each share of stock that he or she owns. CLARK, 
supra note 28, § 9.1.3, at 361. In the context of voting for directors, this means that each shareholder 
may cast that many votes (i.e., one vote times the number of shares owned) for each director. Id. On 
the other hand, cumulative voting—if it is allowed under the laws of the state of incorporation and 
authorized under the corporate charter—allows shareholders to take the total number of votes they 
have (the number of shares times the number of director positions for which the shareholder is entitled 
to vote) and cast them all for one or more directors. The purpose behind cumulative voting, supporters 
say, is that it gives minority shareholders a chance to have at least one director on the board when they 
may not have had such an opportunity in the absence of cumulative voting. Id. § 9.1.3, at 361–64. 
 38. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 375. 
 39. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 44. 
 40. Id. 
 41. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 391.  
 42. CLARK, supra note 28, § 9.2, at 366–68 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000)). Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act requires any security that is traded on any 
national securities exchange to be registered under that section. CLARK, supra, § 9.2, n.1. Such 
securities exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock 
Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations System 
(NASDAQ) are collectively referred to hereinafter as self-regulatory organizations (SROs). See 
DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 361.  
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shareholder) is soliciting a proxy43 from a shareholder, that person must 
also provide, prior to or contemporaneously with the solicitation, and 
pursuant to Rule 14a-3 under the Exchange Act, a proxy statement that is 
in accord with Schedule 14A of Regulation 14A.44 In addition, the person 
or corporation seeking the proxy must provide the shareholder with a 
proxy card on which to vote, and if the proxy card contains the names of 
director nominees up for election at the annual meeting, there must be a 
space in which shareholders can withhold authority to vote for them.45 As 
will become apparent, these rules greatly influence director elections under 
state law. In particular, they prescribe the rules whereby shareholders may 
challenge the directors nominated by the board and thereby affect director 
nominations under state law.46 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MAJORITY-VOTING MOVEMENT 
The majority-voting movement is a recent phenomenon that quickly 
became the issue of the 2005 and 2006 proxy seasons and saw its greatest 
gains in the 2007 proxy season.47 The movement for majority voting in the 
 
 
 43. A proxy refers to a “document or other authorization by which the shareholder grants to 
another person the power to attend a shareholders’ meeting and exercise some or all of the 
shareholder’s voting rights.” Teresa Carnell & James J. Hanks, Jr., Shareholder Voting and Proxy 
Solicitation: The Fundamentals, 37 MD. B.J. 23, 24 (2004).  
 44. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2006); Securities Exchange 
Act Regulation 14A, Schedule A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2006). Note, however, that on January 22, 
2007, the SEC adopted Exchange Act Rule 14a-16, which will allow proxy solicitors to post their 
proxy materials on the internet after giving notice to the shareholders. Internet Availability of Proxy 
Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148 (Jan. 29, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2007)).  
 45. Exchange Act Rule 14a-4(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (2006). Also, the proxy card 
must, in boldface print, indicate whether management is soliciting the proxy. Id. § 240.14a-4(a).  
 The SEC mandated the inclusion of a “withhold” space on the proxy card in 1967. Grundfest, 
supra note 15, at 903. The SEC contemplated mandating an “against” option but decided against doing 
so since, in a majority of states, a plurality-voting standard was in place, and under a plurality-voting 
standard, a withhold vote had no effect. See N. Fork Bancorporation, Inc. v. Toal, 825 A.2d 860, 869 
(Del. Ch. 2000). Thus, the SEC did not want to mislead shareholders into believing that they had a 
right to cast an affirmative vote against a particular candidate for a director when under state law they 
did not. Id. The subject of plurality voting is discussed more fully in Part IV. See infra notes 119–35.  
 46. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3; see also infra text accompanying notes 108–12. The federal 
proxy rules also allow shareholders to make proposals to the board to implement decisions that are 
within the ambit of shareholder power under state law. See infra note 108. 
 47. See, e.g., William Baue, Majority-Vote Director Election Shareowner Resolutions to Top 
100, Dominate Proxy Season, SOCIAL FUNDS, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.socialfunds.com/news/ 
article.cgi/1902.html (“As the 2006 proxy season is taking shape, [the topic of] majority-vote director 
elections . . . is emerging as the one of the biggest issues on the corporate ballots.”); Paul S. Atkins, 
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Comm’r: Remarks at the Corp. Dir. Forum 2007, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch012207.psa.htm (indicating that, for the 2007 proxy 
season, there are already 104 shareholder proposals pending for the adoption of majority voting); see 
also infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
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election of corporate directors is a response to the noted lack of 
shareholder participation in the current system for voting in director 
elections.48 
Before delving into the specifics of plurality and majority voting and 
why many view the plurality-voting model as defunct, it is necessary to 
understand the impetus for the majority-voting movement. To that end, I 
first provide a brief history of corporate governance and the events that 
lead to calls for increased shareholder voice in the direction of the 
corporation. I then discuss the major legislative and regulatory responses 
to the perceived dearth of shareholder participation in corporate affairs, 
including a rule proposed by the SEC in 2003 to deal with the problem. 
A. The History of Corporate Governance—The Failure of the Board of 
Directors to Look After Shareholders’ Interests 
1. The Evolution of the Corporation and the Separation of Ownership 
from Control 
In 1932, Adolf A. Berle and Gardinier C. Means, the authors of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, expressed their concern over 
the extent to which ownership of the corporation by shareholders and 
control of the corporation had diverged.49 They noted that ownership was 
becoming dispersed over many passive investors as corporations grew 
larger and became public, and executives, in place of the shareholders, 
were beginning to manage the corporation.50 Commentators predicted that 
“agency costs” would arise from the need to oversee these executives.51 
Agency costs, in general, arise from the need to monitor agents.52 The 
theory is that agents—in the absence of monitoring by the principals—will 
pursue their own self-interested goals rather than those of the principal.53  
 
 
 48. See Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 45; Deane, supra note 16, at 346; COUNCIL OF INST. 
INVESTORS & NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS. TASK FORCE, LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD: 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAJORITY VOTING, SECTION 404, AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION app. B at 
1 (2007), http://www.nacdonline.org/images/CII-NACD%20Task%20Force%20Report-Reforms-
Final.pdf [hereinafter CII-NACD REPORT]. 
 49. Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 683. 
 50. Id.  
 51. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 379–80. 
 52. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 74–75 (finding the “principal-agent” analogy, when 
applied in a corporate context, to be “flawed,” but noting nevertheless that “[m]uch of the academic 
literature on corporate governance uses a model of the shareholder as principal and the manager as 
agent”). 
 53. Id. at 75 nn.20–21. 
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Directors are supposed to be the solution to the agency problem, as 
they control the hiring, compensation, and firing of the corporation’s 
management54 and owe fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its 
shareholders.55 Thus, when a manager acts contrary to the interest of the 
shareholders or the corporation by undertaking activities that reduce 
corporate value and enhance the principal’s own self-interest, the board is 
supposed to sanction or replace that manager.56 Directors are subject to 
liability for breaches of their fiduciary duties.57  
Of course, directors themselves are agents of the shareholders, and as 
agents, they may produce the same agency costs as the managers. 
Directors may, for example, act in their own self-interest, ignoring the 
interest of the shareholders.58 And though directors are subject to liability 
for breaches of their fiduciary duties, “[c]ourts will generally afford 
directors protection under the ‘business judgment rule’ when they have 
acted in an informed manner, in good faith and in the best interests of the 
corporation.”59 
Unfortunately, history shows that agency cost “theory,” described 
ominously by Berle and Means, is more than just a theory; in many cases, 
it is the reality. “[T]he governance picture that developed through much of 
the twentieth century could be summarized as one of weak boards, 
powerful executives, and shareholders unable to hold either board or 
executives effectively to account.”60 Thus, the board was failing to 




 54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 55. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 376–77 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). 
 56. See Solomon & Lublin, supra note 2, at A1.  
 57. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000) (fiduciary duty of care); Guth v. 
Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (fiduciary duty of loyalty).  
 58. See DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 380.  
 59. Id. at 377 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)). The 
business judgment rule is a presumption that the corporate agents acted in good faith and in the best 
interest of the corporation. Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer 
Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2006). 
Thus, courts generally “defer to [the corporate agents’] decisions.” Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 44. 
 60. Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 683. 
 61. See id.; see also infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (describing the boards’ hands-off 
approach, which facilitated the accomplishment of the massive financial frauds in the 2000s). 
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2. The Market as the Disciplinarian: The Period of the Hostile 
Takeover 
As noted above, even as early as 1932, the agency problem associated 
with the separation of ownership and control permeated the discussion of 
the corporate form.62 For the first part of the twentieth century, though, it 
seemed that there was a solution: the stock market.63 If corporate managers 
and directors were unresponsive to shareholders, shareholders would sell 
the company’s stock and force down the price of the shares.64 This 
downward stock price movement had the effect of making the corporation 
more susceptible to a hostile takeover by a raider. These raiders, noting the 
depressed stock price and seeking to make a profit, would purchase large 
amounts of the stock and could then replace unresponsive management 
after taking control of the board.65 Thus, the theory was that the threat of 
replacement kept incumbent management in line.66 
But some commentators have noted that, during the two decades 
spanning the 1970s and the 1980s (the “takeover period”), the takeover 
mechanism started to get out of hand.67 First, the hostile acquirer who 
purchased the shares in an effort to displace incumbent management did 
not always install better management.68 Second, since these takeovers 
were financed primarily through debt, purchasers became mired in 
excessive levels of debt post acquisition.69 Moreover, management soon 
learned how to circumvent hostile takeovers by developing antitakeover 
devices—e.g., the poison pill70—and by creating conglomerate 
organizations that were too large to take over.71 In addition, states passed 
antitakeover statutes that helped to reduce the incidence of hostile 
takeovers.72 Finally, and perhaps most devastatingly, the frequent hostile 
 
 
 62. See supra text accompanying notes 51–53.  
 63. Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: Comparative 
Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 726 (2003); see also Cadbury & Millstein, 
supra note 1, at 683. 
 64. Adams, supra note 63, at 726; Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 683. 
 65. Adams, supra note 63, at 726–27. The hostile raider hoped to install directors who would 
“make better use of the [corporate] assets,” thereby increasing the value of the corporation as well as 
the value of the raider’s investment. See Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 684. 
 66. See Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 684. 
 67. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 85. 
 68. Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 684.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Poison pills are devices that make it more difficult for hostile bidders to acquire a company. 
See Grundfest, supra note 15, at 858 n.1 (summarizing the mechanics of the poison pill). 
 71. Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 684. 
 72. Grundfest, supra note 15, at 858.  
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takeover attempts worked to foster mistrust between shareholders and 
directors, further eroding the communication between them.73 
3. Shareholders’ Last Resort: Expensive Proxy Contests 
With the “demise of the hostile takeover,” shareholders had only one 
weapon left to battle unyielding boards: the proxy contest.74 A proxy 
contest occurs when shareholders attempt to solicit proxies from other 
shareholders for their own—not management’s—nominee or nominees for 
a director position.75 If a shareholder mounts a successful proxy contest for 
one, multiple, or all of his or her director candidates by soliciting a 
sufficient number of votes from fellow shareholders, then some or all of 
the incumbent directors will be replaced.76  
The problem with proxy contests, however, is that they are very costly 
to wage. The shareholder wishing to initiate one must pay for the cost of 
preparing and mailing out proxy statements to other shareholders,77 and if 
the proxy contest is not successful, she does not recover those costs.78 
Additionally, even if the shareholder were reimbursed, she would still get 
only her proportional interest of the increased value in the share.79 Thus, 
the problem is that the benefit of waging a proxy contest accrues to all 
shareholders, while the risk of loss (the costs) is borne only by the 
shareholder waging the contest.80 It is not surprising, then, that proxy 
contests are a relatively rare phenomenon.81 
 
 
 73. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 85. 
 74. See Grundfest, supra note 15, at 862. Though shareholders have had and continue to have the 
power to bring a derivative suit against the corporate directors and/or officers who they feel are not 
acting in the best interests of the corporation, these suits are very difficult to win because of the 
operation of the business judgment rule, which shields directors and managers from liability for having 
made poor business decisions. CLARK, supra note 28, § 9.5.4, at 396–97. 
 75. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 69. Proxy contests can also involve shareholder 
solicitations for proxies to vote on matters besides director elections, such as “proposed by-law 
amendments.” Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 45–46. 
 76. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 45.  
 77. Grundfest, supra note 15, at 914 (stating that proxy contests can cost the shareholder 
soliciting the proxies millions of dollars); see also Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 65 n.64 (noting the legal 
expenses associated with drafting the proxy statement). But see Atkins, supra note 47 (describing the 
newly adopted Internet Availability of Proxy Materials rules, which should reduce the printing costs 
associated with mailing out proxy statements, but noting also that legal expenses and solicitation 
expenses still remain). 
 78. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) 
(“The stockholders . . . have the right to reimburse successful [proxy] contestants for . . . expenses 
incurred by them.”) (emphasis added). 
 79. Grundfest, supra note 15, at 908–09. 
 80. Id. at 908. This phenomenon is often referred to as the free-rider problem because each 
shareholder “rationally prefers that her fellow shareholders bear the costs of monitoring while she 
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4. The Rise of the Institutional Investor 
The period beginning in the 1970s and extending through the 1990s 
saw a marked increase in the equity holdings of institutional investors.82 
Institutional investors include corporate pension funds, commercial banks, 
insurance companies, and investment banks, to name a few.83 By the late 
1990s, institutional investors owned more than sixty percent of the equity 
in publicly traded companies.84 Many commentators stated that the marked 
increase in ownership of stock by institutional investors was the answer to 
the problem of lack of shareholder voice in corporate governance, perhaps 
in lieu of other unsuccessful governance devices such as takeovers and 
proxy contests.85 The thinking was that such investors were large enough 
that, if they voiced their concerns to management, management would be 
more compelled to listen. In addition, they had the resources to monitor 
management, a practice which, it was hypothesized, would mitigate the 
agency problem.86 However, it soon became clear that institutional 
investors observed what is known as the “‘Wall Street’ Rule;” they 
preferred to liquidate stock that became risky due to poor corporate 
governance, rather than engage in shareholder activism.87 Thus, it 
appeared that institutional investors were not the answer after all.88  
 
 
reaps the benefits for free.” Id. By contrast, in a hostile takeover, though the shareholder is actually 
purchasing all (or a majority) of the shares, which can be a much more costly venture, the benefit 
accrues entirely to that shareholder (if he or she purchases all of the shares). Thus, all else equal, a 
shareholder would prefer to organize a takeover. CLARK, supra note 28, at § 9.5.4, 397–98, 399. 
However, hostile takeovers may be prevented by the antitakeover devices described above. See supra 
notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 45–46. 
 82. See, e.g., Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 684.  
 83. Grundfest, supra note 15, at 919.  
 84. Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional 
Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 9–10 (2004). In 2002, institutional investors held approximately 
49.8% of United States equities. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 381. 
 85. See, e.g., Cadbury & Millstein, supra note 1, at 684. The idea that shareholders should begin 
to look out for their own interests had also been expressed by Justice Brandeis, and institutional 
shareholders seemed capable of actually doing so. Id.  
 86. See id.  
 87. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 619.  
 88. See id. Still, the votes of institutional investors are clearly important, as demonstrated by 
management’s hiring of proxy solicitors to specifically seek the proxies of institutional shareholders. 
See Carnell & Hanks, supra note 43, at 29. Moreover, institutional shareholders may be more likely to 
exhibit shareholder activism today, as private companies functioning as proxy advisory services (for 
example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)) now exist which advise their institutional-
shareholder clients on how to vote on corporate matters. Proxy solicitors often make pitches to ISS so 
that ISS will advise its client to vote a certain way. See id.; see also CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 
48, app. B at 29. 
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5. The 2000s: The Era of Corporate Scandals 
Following unprecedented growth in the stock market during the 1990s 
due to the technology boom and the cooling of concern over shareholder 
activism during that period,89 the stock market experienced drastic 
changes. The year 2001 saw natural gas company Enron collapse upon 
exposure of massive financial fraud. In 2002, the trend continued with the 
collapse of WorldCom and the large losses suffered by Adelphia 
Communications Corporation and Tyco International Ltd.—all as a result 
of financial-reporting fraud. These massive frauds revealed “the systemic 
governance failures in America.”90 The board of directors of each of these 
corporations was implicated for failing to prevent the perpetration of these 
massive financial frauds.91 The entire investment community criticized the 
boards for failing to exercise one of their primary responsibilities: 
monitoring the senior executives to ensure that they were acting in the best 
interest of the company.92 Even today, investors continue to lament the 
“systemic imbalance of power favoring corporate management and 
directors over shareowners.”93 
B. The Legislative and Regulatory Responses 
1. Congress, Self-Regulatory Organizations, and the SEC Take Action 
Following the corporate frauds that obliterated “tens of billions of 
dollars of market capital,”94 Congress, the self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs), and the SEC stepped in and undertook “the most far-reaching set 
 
 
 89. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 366. 
 90. Id. at 364–75. 
 91. See id. at 375 (noting that the observation learned from the corporate scandals was that “[a]n 
effective board of directors is central to good corporate governance”); see also Burns, supra note 1, at 
R6 (remarking that the recent scandals exposed that corporate managers were “acting like corporate 
monarchs—operating unchecked by boards, bankrupting their companies, and leaving shareholders 
with nearly worthless stock”).  
 92. See, e.g., DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 370–71 (describing Enron’s officers’ perpetration of 
accounting frauds and the board’s allowing the officers to get away with it). 
 93. William Baue, Binding Resolutions and Coordination Circumvent Structural Limitations of 
Shareowner Action, SOCIAL FUNDS, Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/ 
1642.html. Current corporate governance issues that continue to vex shareholder activists include 
corporate boards’ willingness to approve exorbitant executive compensation contracts, see, e.g., Burns, 
supra note 1, at R6, and boards’ seeming acquiescence in the practices that have given rise to the 
recently exposed stock-option backdating schemes, see, e.g., Carolyn Said, Backdating Scandal 
Expands: Tougher Regulations Expected to Restrict How Stock Options Fit Within Executive 
Compensation, S.F. CHRON., June 18, 2006, at F1. 
 94. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 364.  
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of new corporate regulation since the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”95 First, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 to improve the quality of information disseminated by 
the financial reporting system.96 Second, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the NASDAQ enacted several new rules, which the SEC 
approved on November 4, 2003,97 requiring that a majority of the board 
consist of independent directors98 and mandating the creation of certain 
key committees of the board.99 The rationale behind requiring that 
directors be independent was to prevent conflicts of interest that might 
otherwise occur in the exercise of the directors’ duties to act on behalf of 
the shareholders.100 
Finally, on November 24, 2003, the SEC passed a new rule requiring 
proxy-statement disclosure of the process whereby the board’s nominating 
committee101 chooses the candidates for director positions.102 The purpose 
of the rule was to increase the transparency to investors of the company’s 
process for nominating directors through disclosure and to allow 
shareholders to independently assess the adequacy of that process.103 
 
 
 95. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 68.  
 96. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., JOEL SELIGMAN & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 53–54 (10th ed. 2007).  
 97. See DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 385. 
 98. See, e.g., NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2003). The NYSE defines an 
independent director as one who “has no material relationship with the listed company.” An example 
of a material relationship is an employment relationship with the company or having a family member 
who was an executive officer of the company. Id. § 303A.02(a), (b). 
 99. Id. §§ 303A.04–.05, .07. These committees include the audit committee, the nominating/ 
corporate-governance committee, and the compensation committee. Id. 
 100. See id. § 303A.01 cmt. 
 101. All companies listing on the NYSE must now have a nominating committee. See id. 
§ 303A.04. Their primary function is “recommend[ing] candidates for inclusion on corporate proxy 
ballots.” Burns, supra note 1, at R6. Though the nominating committee recommends candidates as an 
initial matter, the board “has the final say in selecting [the actual] nominees.” Id. Prior to the SRO and 
SEC rules, companies were not required to have nominating committees. See DeGaetano, supra note 
10, at 404. In 1977, the SEC adopted rules requiring companies to disclose whether they had a 
nominating committee and whether the committee would consider director nominees proposed by 
shareholders. Id. Those companies that did have nominating committees did not always require that 
the committee consist of a majority of independent directors. See CLARK, supra note 28, § 3.2.1, at 
109 (pointing out that the nominating committees used to be staffed by management or friends of 
management and thus would be strongly inclined to nominate incumbent, management-friendly 
directors).  
 102. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 387–89. 
 103. See id. at 387–88. Specifically, the rule required disclosure of the following: the nominating 
committee’s process for identifying and choosing between director nominees; whether the board 
would consider nominees suggested by shareholders (and if so, the procedure shareholders had to 
follow to have the board consider a nominee); the minimum qualifications a director nominee had to 
meet to be eligible; the company’s process whereby shareholders could communicate with directors; 
and certain other disclosures pertaining to directors. Id. at 388–90. The rule also required that the 
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2. The Proposed Shareholder-Access Rule 
On October 14, 2003 the SEC issued for public comment Proposed 
Rule 14a-11, the Security Holder Director Nominations Rule (the 
“Proposed Rule”), which soon became one of the most controversial rules 
the SEC had ever proposed.104 The purpose of the rule was to “‘improve 
the ability of security holders to participate meaningfully in the 
nomination and election of directors . . . without unduly burdening 
companies . . . where . . . the proxy process may be ineffective.’”105 The 
concern driving the proposal of the rule was that the operation of the proxy 
rules did not provide shareholders an adequate voice in the election of the 
directors who were to represent their interests.106 The SEC observed that 
the current state of director elections was that the corporation—by way of 
the nominating committee—exclusively provided the slate of nominees on 
which shareholders were to vote.107 
Taking plurality voting under state law as given, the SEC planned to 
use the Proposed Rule to dismantle the other force contributing to the lack 
of shareholder voice in the election of directors: the inability of 
shareholders to “bypass the nominating committee” and nominate their 
own directors in the company’s official proxy statement without having to 
wage a proxy contest and therefore without paying the associated 
expenses.108 In order to foster this proxy statement access, the Proposed 
 
 
company disclose its policies pertaining to directors’ attendance at meetings and disclose the number 
of directors who attended the previous annual meeting. Id. at 389. 
 104. Id. at 393. Following publication of the rule, the SEC received over twelve thousand public 
comment letters. Id. 
 105. Id. at 393–94 (quoting Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 
(proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274)).  
 106. See id. at 390. 
 107. See id. Shortly after the SEC issued the Proposed Rule, the SROs promulgated rules 
requiring listed companies’ nominating committees to consist entirely of independent directors. See 
supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. Despite this change, however, the SEC noted that “the 
presence of nominating committees [still had] not eliminated [shareholders’] concerns . . . with regard 
to the barriers to meaningful participation in the proxy process.” Security Holder Director 
Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,786.  
 In addition to the problems with the nomination process, the SEC observed that the small number 
of election contests due to the operation of the proxy rules, in conjunction with the state-law plurality-
voting standard—which prevents shareholders from voting against the incumbent directors, see infra 
text accompanying note 124—meant that shareholders had no effective mechanism to elect someone 
other than an incumbent director. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 390–91. A contested election is one in 
which a proxy contest has produced more nominees than there are seats for directors, creating 
competition among the incumbent (board-nominated) and nonincumbent (shareholder-nominated) 
director nominees. See, e.g., CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 4–5. The “vast majority” of 
director elections in public companies are uncontested. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 6. 
 108. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 390. Shareholders wishing to include voting proposals on the 
Washington University Open Scholarship











Rule essentially allowed qualified shareholders109—upon the occurrence of 
certain triggering events110—to nominate less than a full slate of directors 
by placing his or her nominees directly into the company’s official proxy 
statement.111 The effect of the rule was to allow shareholders to initiate an 
election contest without having to prepare and distribute a proxy 
statement, which, as noted previously, entails a substantial cost.112  
Opponents of the Proposed Rule—including corporate directors, 
executives, law firms, and business groups—vociferously attacked it.113 
Their primary basis for opposition was that the rule would be costly and 
 
 
company’s “official” proxy statement (i.e., the proxy statement that accompanies the proxy cards with 
which the incumbent directors intend to solicit votes for their reelection) currently have some limited 
access to that proxy statement under Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act. Rule 14a-8 is often called the 
Shareholder Proposal Rule. See Shareholder Proposals: What You Need to Know, COOLEY ALERT! 
(Cooley Godward LLP), Jan. 13, 2004, at 1, http://www.cooley.com/files/tbl_s24News/ 
PDFUpload152/780/ALERT_Shareholder_Proposal.pdf. Under this rule, certain shareholders may be 
able to include certain proposals on the company’s proxy statement. See id. Typically, such proposals 
are precatory (or nonbinding), meaning that they only recommend that the board take a particular 
action. Id. at 4. The reason that the shareholders submit only precatory proposals is that the rule allows 
the company to keep off the proxy statement any proposal that relates to an issue over which the 
shareholder has no say under the state’s corporate law. Id.; see also Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(1), 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2006). And, as noted earlier, shareholders have very limited voting rights 
under most states’ corporate laws, including Delaware’s. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying 
text. Precatory proposals, on the other hand, do not demand that the board take action on the topic, and 
therefore the company may not exclude such a proposal. Shareholder Proposals: What You Need to 
Know, supra, at 4; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1). Shareholder proposals often pertain to 
corporate-governance topics; common proposals include those calling for the elimination of poison-
pill provisions and those requesting that the chairman of the board be someone other than the CEO. 
Shareholder Proposals: What You Need to Know, supra, at 2. 
 Whatever the range of topics permissible under Rule 14a-8, the company does not have to include 
any proposal that “relates to an election for membership on the company’s board of directors.” 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). Thus, under the rule, shareholders do not have access to the company’s 
proxy statement to place a nominee for a director candidate on the company’s proxy statement. See 
Shareholder Proposals: What You Need to Know, supra, at 3, 4. The Proposed Rule sought to allow 
shareholders to do precisely that. See infra text accompanying notes 109–12.  
 109. The Proposed Rule defined a qualifying shareholder as one who beneficially owned five 
percent or more of the issuer’s equity securities, in addition to satisfying other holding-period and 
filing requirements. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 396–97.  
 110. The “triggering events” were designed to target those companies at which there existed 
“‘evidence of ineffectiveness or security holder dissatisfaction with [the] company’s proxy process.’” 
Id. at 395 (quoting Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789–90). The triggering 
events were the following: (1) any of the company’s directors’ receipt of thirty-five percent or more 
withhold votes of those cast in a director election; or (2) a shareholder proposal submitted under Rule 
14a-8 asking for the invocation of the Proposed Rule at the next annual meeting of the company, 
where the proposal received a majority of the votes cast by shareholders at the annual meeting. Id. at 
395. 
 111. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 390–91, 394–99. 
 112. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 83. 
 113. See, e.g., Corporate and Securities Law Blog, SEC to Revisit Proxy Access, http://www. 
corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/46378-print.html (Sept. 7, 2006).  
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was unnecessary.114 Perhaps as a result of this fierce opposition, the SEC 
did not adopt the Proposed Rule.115 On November 28, 2007, after several 
years of heated debate, the SEC finally put the issue to rest by adopting a 
clarifying amendment to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which indicated 
that shareholders may not make shareholder proposals giving shareholders 
the power to propose director nominees in the company’s proxy statement. 
This amendment effectively stripped shareholders of the power to use the 
proxy statement to do what the Proposed Rule would have otherwise 
allowed them to do.116 
IV. THE MAJORITY-VOTING MOVEMENT 
The death of the Proposed Rule was one of the most significant 
catalysts of the majority-voting movement.117 Many shareholders were 
perturbed that they had so little voice in the election of directors. 
Following the corporate scandals, moreover, they felt this disability to be 
even more of a handicap.118 Thus, shareholder activists, institutional 
investors, and their advisers turned to changing the state-law voting 
standard in director elections existing in nearly all the states—that is, the 
plurality-voting standard.119  
 
 
 114. See DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 408–20. Opponents of the Rule espoused myriad 
arguments, some of which are described more fully at Part.IV.A. See infra notes 197–203 and 
accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., Deane, supra note 16, at 340. 
 116. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,450 
(Dec. 11, 2007). The SEC took action in November 2007 as a result of the decision in AFSCME v. 
American International Group. Id. at 70,451–53. In that case, the court refused to allow the company 
to exclude, under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8), a shareholder proposal calling for a bylaw that 
would institute a procedure for shareholders to use the company’s proxy statement to nominate 
directors. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, 462 F.3d 121, 125, 130–
31 (2d Cir. 2006). The case was simply an interpretation of the SEC’s own Rule 14a-8(i)(8), but the 
court’s decision was in conflict with the SEC’s asserted interpretation of the Rule. See id. at 126, 129. 
The SEC has now clarified its position with the amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8). Jane K. Storero, 
Jeffrey M. Taylor & Tifarah K. Roberts Allen, SEC Adopts Rule Limiting Shareholder Access, Blank 
Rome LLP Corporate and Securities Update (Jan. 2008), http:/www.blankrome.com/index.cfm? 
contentID=33.  
 117. See Council of Institutional Investors, Majority Voting Primer—Making Shareowners’ Votes 
Count: Majority Voting in Director Elections 1 (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.cii.org/ 
policies/MajorityVotingPrimer.pdf [hereinafter CII, Majority Voting Primer]. 
 118. See DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 375, 406. 
 119. See CII, MAJORITY VOTING PRIMER, supra note 117, at 1. The election of corporate directors 
is governed by state law. See supra text accompanying note 12. The SEC does not generally have the 
power to mandate internal governance standards and, as such, has not and probably will not become 
involved in the majority-voting debate. See supra note 27; see also infra note 198 and accompanying 
text; cf. Deane, supra note 16, at 345, 361 n.24 (indicating that some believe that “majority voting 
should be considered ‘as a supplement to, and not a replacement for, the right of shareholders to have 
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A. The Distinction Between Plurality and Majority Voting 
The concept of plurality voting is simple: the “‘plurality vote’ is well 
understood to mean the receipt of the most votes for a nominee or 
nominees without regard to the number of votes against or not cast.”120 
Plurality voting is the default voting standard in the election of corporate 
directors in most states.121 However, in nearly all of the states, plurality 
voting is not mandatory, so corporations can provide in their 
organizational documents that a different voting standard (e.g., majority 
voting) applies.122 
The consequence of plurality voting in an uncontested election is that 
each incumbent director is elected even when receiving only one 
affirmative vote “for” his or her election.123 Withheld votes are 
 
 
their director nominees included in company proxy materials [as per the Proposed Rule]’”) (quoting 
ISS Comment Letter, Re: Security Holder Director Nominations, Apr. 12, 2004). Thus, the majority-
voting debate is likely to be waged at the state level, as it has been. 
 120. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 2.  
 121. Id. The DGCL and MBCA, which “[a] substantial majority of the states follow . . . to a 
significant extent,” both use plurality voting as the default standard. See id. at 2–3 (citing MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (2006) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006)). Missouri and Illinois appear to 
be the only two states that mandate the use of majority voting. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.365(2) 
(2006); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7.60 (West 2006); see also CHARLES I. COGUT ET AL., 
MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS: A LOOK BACK AND A LOOK AHEAD 2 (Aug. 4, 2006), 
http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub560.pdf. By contrast, Nevada is the only state which 
mandates plurality voting. Deane, supra note 16, at 338, 360 n.3 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 78.330(1) (West 2006)). 
 122. Deane, supra note 16, at 338, 360 n.3. Under Delaware law, the plurality-voting standard 
may be modified by “specification in the certificate of incorporation [i.e., charter] or bylaws of the 
corporation” of “the votes that shall be necessary for[] the transaction of any business.” DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006). The “transaction of any business” includes the election of directors. Id.; see 
also id. § 216(3). “In the absence of such specification,” however, the plurality-voting standard 
applies. Id. § 216; see also id. § 216(3). The DGCL’s default plurality-voting provision states that 
“[d]irectors are elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by 
proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 The MBCA contains similar language, providing for a default plurality-voting standard. See ABA 
DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 2 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (2006)). As under 
Delaware law, the plurality-voting standard can be modified under the MBCA, but only in the articles 
of incorporation (equivalent to the charter). Id. at 2 n.2. Although the effectuation of a change to 
majority voting under the MBCA can be accomplished only through amendment of the articles of 
incorporation, which requires both board initiation and shareholder approval, the ABA recently added 
section 10.22 to the MBCA, which allows a corporation to adopt a bylaw provision that approximates 
a majority-voting standard. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22 (2006). This amendment to the 
MBCA, as well as recent amendments to Delaware law, are explored more fully below. See infra notes 
165–75 and accompanying text. 
 123. See, e.g., Deane, supra note 16, at 338. In other words, in an uncontested election, incumbent 
directors are “certain to win.” Id. By way of example, suppose there are twelve directorship positions, 
which is the most common constituency of corporate boards. Burns, supra note 1, at R6. Suppose 
further that there are only twelve nominees. Those directors are ensured election because they 
necessarily will receive “the highest number of affirmative votes, up to the number of directors to be 
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disregarded under a plurality-voting system; only affirmative votes “for” 
the director are counted.124 By contrast, in order to be elected under a 
majority-voting system, each director would need to receive an affirmative 
majority of the votes. In other words, fifty percent or more of the votes 
received by that director must be “for” the director, rather than withheld.125 
Majority voting, in giving effect to their withheld votes, provides 
shareholders an effective way to vote against a director.126 
Plurality voting was not always the standard applicable to director 
elections. In fact, majority voting was the default standard in most states—
including Delaware and those states having adopted the Model Business 
Corporation Act (MBCA)—until the 1980s.127 The concern that 
precipitated the change to plurality voting was the risk that contested 
elections would give rise to failed elections.128 In a contested election, 
there is a possibility that all of the candidates could fail to receive a 
majority of the votes and hence none would be elected, even though all the 
director seats could clearly be filled by those who received the most (i.e., a 
plurality) of the votes.129 In order to prevent the occurrence of failed 
 
 
elected,” provided that they get at least one affirmative, or “for,” vote. See Corporate and Securities 
Law Blog, Majority Vote in Director Elections: Alternate Standards, http://www.corporate 
securitieslawblog.com/9144-print.html (Mar. 13, 2006). Further, since many directors are 
shareholders, they can simply cast their votes for themselves. See Deane, supra, at 345, 361 n.25.  
 124. See Deane, supra note 16, at 339, 360 nn.4–6. However, the withhold vote may still retain 
independent significance as a simple way for shareholders to express dissatisfaction with individual 
director candidates. See Grundfest, supra note 15, at 865–66. Still, the vote is only a “symbol” and has 
no legal effect. Id. 
 A related issue under the current voting system is whether giving the withhold vote legal 
significance would really make much of a difference in ousting ineffective incumbents, when 
considering the operation of the stock exchanges’ broker nonvote rules. See, e.g., ABA DISCUSSION 
PAPER, supra note 34, at 12. A “broker nonvote” occurs when a registered broker, the actual record 
holder of the shares for the beneficial owner, votes for the beneficial owner on some routine matter of 
corporate business because the broker has not received voting instructions from the beneficial owner 
on how to vote. See Carnell & Hanks, supra note 43, at 25; see also Julius J. Brecht, Casting a Vote 
When You Miss the Meeting, ALASKA J. COM., Mar. 29, 2004, available at http://www.alaskajournal. 
com/stories/062804/wea_20040628024.shtml. History has shown that brokers typically vote pro-
management, and thus the broker nonvote rule has been called one which “transform[s] shareholder 
apathy and ignorance into votes of shareholder support.” Grundfest, supra, at 924. The purpose of 
allowing such votes is to ensure that the quorum requirements are satisfied. Id. However, as described 
below, the NYSE may amend the broker nonvote rules. See infra text accompanying notes 241–46. 
 125. COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 2. Alternatively, a majority-voting standard may require 
each director to receive a majority of affirmative votes out of all the votes that would have been cast 
had all shareholders entitled to vote voted—“a higher hurdle” than a simple majority of votes cast for 
or against that director at the meeting. See Deane, supra note 16, at 342. 
 126. See CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 7. 
 127. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 5–6 (noting that a plurality-voting provision was 
added to the MBCA in 1983, the DGCL in 1987, and Maryland’s corporate code in 1981). 
 128. See id. at 5. 
 129. Id. The ABA’s Discussion Paper quotes the official comment to the 1987 amendment to the 
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elections in this way, states chose to retain plurality voting as the default 
standard.130 But, in giving a corporation the option to adopt a majority-
voting standard, the states did not fully eliminate the risk of failed 
elections.131 Therefore, the states also passed the so-called “holdover 
rules.”132 These rules essentially states that a director who failed to be 
reelected would “hold over” in that position until certain events, such as 
the replacement of the director, occurred.133  
Serious criticism of the plurality-voting system has arisen as of late. 
Critics of the plurality-voting standard claim that the rationale behind it is 
no longer applicable in director elections, as director elections are almost 
always uncontested.134 Furthermore, critics argue that plurality voting 
deprives shareholders of meaningful participation in uncontested director 
elections, since the board-nominated incumbents are ensured election.135 
 
 
DGCL, which stated that though “‘[t]he Delaware rule [had] been that a vote of the majority of those 
present [was] required to take stockholder action . . . it was thought that at least in the case of the 
election of directors, the statute should only require a plurality vote.’” Id.  
 130. Id. at 5–6. 
 131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 132. COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 2. 
 133. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.05(e) (2006). 
The holdover rule in place in the DGCL, for example, mandates that if a director fails to be elected at 
an annual meeting of the shareholders, then that director will hold over until the first of several events 
occurs: (1) the holdover director resigns; (2) the holdover director is removed by a vote of the 
shareholders at a subsequently called meeting; or (3) a qualified replacement for the holdover director 
is nominated and elected by the shareholders under the voting standard applicable to director elections. 
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(b). The operation of the holdover rule is explored more fully below. See 
infra notes 273–85 and accompanying text.  
 The MBCA’s holdover default rule may be modified or eliminated in the company’s articles of 
incorporation. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.05(e). On the other hand, it does not appear that the 
company can modify the Delaware holdover rule either in its charter or bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN., 
tit. 8, § 141(b).  
 One curious result of the holdover rule under a majority-voting standard and in a contested 
election is that if none of the director nominees received the requisite majority of the votes, but the 
nonincumbent nominees still received more votes than the incumbents (and hence, would have been 
elected under a plurality-voting system), the incumbent directors would continue to serve due to the 
holdover rule, even though they received fewer votes. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 5–
6. For this reason, even proponents of majority voting do not contend that it should apply in contested 
elections—at least where the holdover rule is in place and at least one of the nonincumbent nominees 
is nominated by a shareholder (and not management). See ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 
18–19 & nn.26–27 (explaining that there is no need for majority voting in a contested election because 
shareholders can, in effect, vote against incumbent management by casting a vote for a shareholder-
nominated candidate); see also CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 7 (though advocating 
majority voting, stating also that “the plurality vote standard is the appropriate vote standard for 
contested director elections as it provides for a fair and efficient outcome”). Thus, the discussion of the 
issues that majority voting creates are discussed throughout this Note in the context of uncontested 
elections.  
 134. See, e.g., Deane, supra note 16, at 338. 
 135. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 30. 
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B. The Momentum of the Majority-Voting Movement 
In light of the corporate scandals and the perceived lack of shareholder 
input in the director-election process, proponents of majority voting began 
pushing the new standard as a working alternative.136 The impetus for the 
movement is the idea that the director-election process is broken—that it 
has become a mere formality resulting in the election of an incumbent 
slate of directors.137 The stalling of the Proposed Rule, however, appears 
to be the most significant catalyst in the majority-voting movement.138 
Recognizing that the promulgation and subsequent nonenactment of the 
Proposed Rule meant that shareholders would continue to go without 
participation in director elections, several prominent institutions (including 
proxy advisory services and pension fund associations139) began to 
research majority voting and came to strongly support it as an alternative 
to the current director-election system.140 
In addition, the institutional shareholders that the above institutions 
advised began to use the shareholder proposal process under Exchange Act 
Rule 14a-8 as a vehicle to put the standard to a vote at certain companies 
and generally to advertise the majority-voting standard.141 During the 2006 
proxy season, these institutional shareholders142 submitted more than 140 
shareholder proposals calling for the adoption of a majority-voting 
standard.143 The proposals filed took either of two forms. The first was 
 
 
 136. See, e.g., Baue, supra note 93 (“‘As long as [the Proposed Rule] is not enacted by the SEC, 
then there is going to be a reexamination of how the balance of power between shareholders and 
management can be leveled . . . .’” (quoting Rich Ferlauto, the director of pension and benefit policy at 
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME))). 
 137. See supra note 135. 
 138. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 9 n.13; CII, MAJORITY VOTING PRIMER, supra 
note 117, at 1. 
 139. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a proxy advisory service; the 
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), an organization consisting of members 
representing private and institutional investors; and the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), an 
association of corporate, public, and union pension funds that control a significant amount (three 
trillion dollars) of pension assets, all took part in researching the majority-voting standard. See Baue, 
supra note 47; Deane, supra note 16, at 342. 
 140. See Deane, supra note 16, at 337. A shareholder effectively votes against a director nominee 
by casting a withhold vote. See id.; see also infra Part V.B.2.c (describing how the withhold vote 
interacts with a majority-voting standard). 
 141. See, e.g., CII, MAJORITY VOTING PRIMER, supra note 117, at 1–3.  
 142. Two of perhaps the most active institutional shareholders placing shareholder proposals for 
majority voting on the ballots over the past few proxy seasons have been AFSCME and the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS). Id. at 3; see also Baue, supra note 47. 
 143. See, e.g., Henry Lesser, Mark F. Hoffman & William H. Bromfeld, Majority Voting: Where 
Are We Now?, DLA PIPER, Aug. 25, 2006, http://www.dlapiper.com/majority_voting/. Additionally, 
these numbers are up from the 2005 proxy season, when shareholders filed upwards of eighty such 
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binding shareholder proposals. In other words, if shareholders voted to 
adopt the proposal, the proposal would require the corporation to adopt an 
actual bylaw amendment.144 The second was precatory proposals. These 
proposals merely recommended that the board consider adopting a 
majority-voting standard.145 
To say that shareholders are submitting majority-voting proposals is 
one thing; their voting to adopt the proposals and the company’s 
willingness to effectuate the proposal so adopted are another.146 However, 
it has become clear over the 2005–07 proxy seasons that majority-voting 
proposals are receiving substantial support from shareholders and that 
companies are working to effectuate them.147 The average rate of support 
for majority-voting shareholder proposals during the 2007 proxy season 
 
 
proposals. COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 3. And, by further contrast, in 2004, only twelve 
shareholder proposals calling for majority voting appeared on companies’ ballots during the proxy 
season, with support for the proposals averaging around eighteen percent. Deane, supra note 16, at 
354. 
 144. Under Delaware law, shareholders may unilaterally adopt bylaw amendments; no board 
approval is required. See ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 31 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 109 (2006)).  
 145. Lesser, supra note 143. 
 146. Notably, not all companies responded favorably to the receipt of these shareholder proposals 
in the first instance. In fact, twenty-seven companies during the 2006 proxy season petitioned the SEC 
with no-action letters, asking the SEC to allow the company to exclude the shareholder proposals 
calling for the adoption of majority voting from the proxy statement. See CII, MAJORITY VOTING 
PRIMER, supra note 117, at 2–3. A company may submit a no-action letter when it wishes to exclude a 
shareholder proposal submitted to it for inclusion in the proxy statement; the company must file a 
letter with the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance “explaining the legal basis for its decision” to 
exclude the proposal. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l. Group, Inc., 462 
F.3d 121, 123 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006). If the Division’s staff issues a no-action letter, the SEC will not file a 
civil suit against the company for violation of the proxy rules in excluding the proposal. Id.  
 However, the SEC has generally refused to issue no-action letters to companies trying to exclude 
majority-voting shareholder proposals. See, e.g., CII, MAJORITY VOTING PRIMER, supra note 117, at 3 
(explaining how the SEC refused to issue a no-action letter for Hewlett-Packard’s attempted exclusion 
of a majority-voting proposal on the basis that it had already “substantially implemented” the proposal 
under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(10)); see also COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 3. Apparently, 
majority-voting proposals do not “relate[] to an election for membership on the company’s board of 
directors,” within the meaning of Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which is one of the thirteen legal bases upon which 
companies can rely to exclude shareholder proposals; if they did so relate, they would be excludable. 
See Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i), -8(i)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i), -8(i)(8) (2006). Yet, the SEC has 
allowed several companies—including Halliburton, Qwest, and Verizon—to exclude from their proxy 
statements shareholder proposals to allow shareholders to include their own director nominees on the 
proxy statement, as the Proposed Rule would have allowed. William Baue, Mixed Messages and Flip-
Flops as the SEC Director Nomination Rule Stagnates, SOCIAL FUNDS, Feb. 11, 2005, 
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/article1636.html.  
 147. E.g., Claudia H. Allen, Majority Voting in Director Elections—An Activist Success Story, 
NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, Nov. 13, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/ 
upload/surveyalert111307.pdf; Deane, supra note 16, at 342–344; CII, MAJORITY VOTING PRIMER, 
supra note 117, at 2–3; COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 1; Lesser, supra note 143. 
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was in excess of 50%,148 up from 47.8% during the 2006 proxy season.149 
Additionally, 66% of S&P 500 companies and more than 57% of 
companies in the Fortune 500 have instituted some form of majority 
voting, whether an informal corporate-governance policy or a bylaw 
amendment.150 
Companies responding cooperatively to the majority-voting proposals 
have instituted director-election reforms but have done so in different 
ways. The most popular approach appears to be that first employed by 
Pfizer Inc., a Delaware corporation.151 On June 23, 2005, Pfizer’s board, 
though it actually retained a plurality-voting standard, nevertheless 
adopted a “corporate governance policy” which requires that directors 
receiving more withheld than “for” votes in an uncontested election 
“promptly tender [their] resignation[s].”152 In this event, the board’s 
corporate-governance committee makes a recommendation on whether to 
accept the nominee’s tendered resignation.153 The board of directors makes 
the final decision on the basis of the committee’s recommendation and 
does so within ninety days of the vote.154 Taking Pfizer’s lead, over one 
hundred companies subsequently adopted Pfizer-styled “director 
resignation policies.”155 
On the other hand, the Intel Corporation (also incorporated in 
Delaware) embraced a different approach. Intel adopted an amendment to 
its bylaws.156 The amendment expressly changed Intel’s voting standard in 
 
 
 148. Allen, supra note 147, at 2. 
 149. Lesser, supra note 143. Both of these figures have increased significantly since shareholders 
first began submitting majority-voting shareholder proposals in 2004. In 2004, the proposals ranged 
from 7% to 18% support. Deane, supra note 16, at 344. In 2005, 43.7% of the proposals received a 
majority of the votes. Lesser, supra note 143. Note, however, that even support in the 18% range is 
high for shareholder proposals, especially those which are proposed “in their first years; proposals 
typically gather increasing support in subsequent years.” Deane, supra note 16, at 344.  
 150. Allen, supra note 147, at 1. These figures are up from 28% and 25%, respectively, in 2006. 
Claudia H. Allen, May 17, 2006 Study Update Reveals 25% of Fortune 500 Companies and 28% of 
S&P 500 Companies Have Adopted Majority Voting Standards, NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, 
May 18, 2006, at 1, http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/alert_ survey_callen_051806.pdf. See infra 
notes 151–54, 156–58, 160–64 and accompanying text (comparing corporate governance “policies” 
designed to approximate a majority-voting standard and bylaw amendments designed to implement 
actual majority-voting standards). 
 151. See COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 3. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. If the nominee at issue is also a member of the corporate governance committee, he or she 
would not participate in the decision. Id. In making the decision, the committee may consider what 
caused the nominee to receive the number of withheld votes he or she received. See id. at 3–4. 
 154. Id. at 3. The board publishes its decision and the reasons for the decision in a Form 8-K filed 
with the SEC. Id. at 3–4. 
 155. Id. at 4.  
 156. Id. at 5. 
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uncontested director elections from a plurality to a majority standard.157 
Thus, under Intel’s approach, a director is not elected if that director fails 
to receive an affirmative majority of the votes cast at the meeting; by 
contrast, under the Pfizer approach, a director receiving more withheld 
votes than affirmative votes is still elected but must submit a 
resignation.158 Other companies have followed Intel’s example and 
adopted bylaws requiring majority voting in director elections.159 
Though the end result of both the Pfizer and the Intel approach is 
similar,160 majority-voting proponents view the Intel standard far more 
favorably.161 They describe the Intel standard as a “true” majority-voting 
standard,162 whereas the Pfizer standard is sometimes termed a “‘modified’ 
plurality standard.”163 In general, majority-voting proponents express that 
 
 
 157. Id. The amendment specifically states that “each director shall be elected by the vote of the 
majority of the votes cast with respect to the director at any meeting for the election of directors . . . 
provided that if the number of nominees exceeds the number of directors to be elected, the directors 
shall be elected by the vote of a plurality.” Id. at E-1 (emphases added).  
 158. Compare id. at D-1 (under Pfizer standard, director receiving more withheld votes tenders 
resignation but is still elected under plurality voting), with id. at E-1 (under Intel standard, director is 
elected only if he or she receives a majority of the votes cast). See also Charles Nathan, 
Implementation of Majority Voting: The Devil in the Details, 14 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, 
May/June 2006, at 1–2, available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub1561_1.pdf. The 
Intel standard allows shareholders to vote either “for” or “against” a particular director, and both 
options appear on the proxy card. COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 5. By contrast, the Pfizer approach 
retains the use of the “withhold” vote, since, under a plurality-voting standard, “against” votes are not 
counted. Id.  
 Further, even though under Intel’s standard a director is not elected when he fails to receive an 
affirmative majority of the votes, due to the effect of the holdover rule, that director would still hold 
over in the director position until certain events occurred. See supra note 133. Therefore, Intel’s 
bylaws also state that the director “shall offer to tender his or her resignation to the Board” if that 
director is “not elected.” COGUT ET AL., supra, at E-1. The director resignation thus serves to cut off 
the holdover period by giving the board the power to accept a director’s tendered resignation. Id. at 5.  
 159. See Allen, supra note 147, at 3 (“The percentage of companies adopting majority voting 
bylaws or charter provisions has steadily increased . . . .”). Allen’s 2007 study found that of the 534 
companies included in the study that had initiated a majority-voting-styled corporate-governance 
change, 223 (42%) had adopted director-resignation policies in the style of Pfizer (as opposed to 
bylaw/charter amendments), 160 (30%) had adopted bylaw/charter amendments, and 151 (28%) 
adopted both. Id. at 3. The percentage of companies adopting Intel-styled policies has increased 
substantially from Allen’s 2006 study, which found that only 17% of the companies surveyed had 
adopted bylaw/charter amendments. Allen, supra note 150, at 1. 
 160. The similarities and differences between the Pfizer and Intel approaches revolve around the 
operation of the holdover rule. See infra note 283 and accompanying text. 
 161. See, e.g., COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 5.  
 162. See Lesser, supra note 143. Proponents also refer to the Intel standard as the “gold standard” 
of majority-voting-type policies. COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 5 (quoting Pat McGurn, Executive 
Vice President of ISS).  
 163. Lesser, supra note 143. ISS has stated that it would recommend that its institutional-
shareholder clients vote against shareholder proposals calling for majority voting only if the company 
has adopted its own “true” majority-voting policy or an equivalent alternative; ISS has already 
demonstrated its support for Intel-styled policies by recommending votes against director-resignation 
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Intel-styled standards fully empower shareholders to “elect or un-elect 
directors,” while Pfizer-styled policies do not.164 
C. Legislative Responses to Majority Voting 
The key actors in state-law corporate legislation, namely the Delaware 
legislature and the American Bar Association (ABA) (which proposes and 
adopts amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA))165 
have also responded to the majority-voting movement, but neither by 
mandating the implementation of majority voting nor by making it the 
default standard.166 Rather, they generally altered certain provisions of the 
corporate codes that frustrated the majority-voting policies that companies 
were already adopting.167 
The most glaring of these problems was the question of whether 
director resignations conditioned on the failure to receive a certain vote at 
the election were enforceable under Delaware law and the MBCA.168 
Another problem was that, under Delaware law, the board could 
unilaterally amend or repeal bylaws, which allowed the board to change 
shareholder-adopted majority-voting bylaw amendments.169 
 
 
policies which are not incorporated into the bylaws. See COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 4–5 
(describing the criteria ISS uses to determine whether a voting standard equates with a “true” majority-
voting policy and noting that director-resignation policies which are plurality-voting standards but are 
incorporated into the bylaws may be sufficient). 
 164. See CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 32. 
 165. See supra note 30. 
 166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 216 (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22 (2006); see 
Celeste S. Ferber, Scott M. Stanton & Marshall L. Small, Delaware Amends General Corporation Law 
to Address Issues Relating to Majority Voting for Director Elections, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, 
July 2006, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update02228.html. In June 2005, the ABA’s 
Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law began reviewing the MBCA’s 
provisions relating to director elections and evaluating alternatives to plurality voting. ABA 
DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 1. 
 167. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), 216; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22. 
 168. See, e.g., Ferber et al., supra note 166. Addressing the enforceability (and revocability) of 
such resignations is necessary under both Pfizer- and Intel-styled policies due to the operation of the 
holdover rule. See supra note 133; see also infra note 170 and accompanying text. Still, even allowing 
for the enforceability and irrevocability of such resignations, there is another potential problem: the 
DGCL and MBCA do not specifically give directors or the company the power to, in the first instance, 
require the resignation of the director. See infra note 282 for a discussion of the problems created by 
the board’s inability to remove directors and for potential solutions.  
 169. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 109(a) (stating that shareholders have “the power to adopt, 
amend or repeal bylaws” but may also “confer [this] power . . . upon the directors”); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 10.20(a), (b) (giving both shareholders and directors the power to amend or repeal 
bylaws subject to certain exceptions pertaining to directors); see also Posting of Gordon Smith to the 
Conglomerate Blog, Delaware Bylaws, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/07/delaware_bylaws. 
html (July 21, 2006). The MBCA provision, however, also allows shareholders, in amending or 
repealing bylaws, to expressly indicate in the bylaw provisions that the board cannot amend or repeal 
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The Delaware legislature and the ABA sought to fix these holes by 
amending, respectively, the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) 
and the MBCA. The amendments—effective August 1, 2006 for the 
DGCL and adopted June 20, 2006 for the MBCA—specifically provide 
for the enforceability of resignations whose tendering is made contingent 
on the occurrence of some future event (such as the failure to get a 
majority of the votes at a director election).170 The amendment to the 
DGCL also stipulated that the board of directors can no longer amend a 
bylaw that is adopted by shareholders and that pertains to the election of 
directors.171  
The ABA went a step further in adding section 10.22 to the MBCA.172 
Section 10.22 allows a company to voluntarily elect to adopt that statutory 
section in its bylaws.173 This provision provides a framework for 
implementation of a majority-voting-like policy in uncontested elections 
only.174 Essentially, in uncontested elections, director nominees must 
receive a plurality of the votes to be elected, provided that if the nominee 
receives “more votes against than for election,” the director will serve for 
a maximum ninety-day period.175 
The California legislature also recently amended its Corporations Code 
to allow corporations to adopt a majority-voting standard in uncontested 
 
 
the bylaw. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b)(2). 
 170. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.07(b) (2006); COGUT 
ET AL., supra note 121, at 6. Resignations made conditional on failure to receive a specified vote may 
also be made irrevocable. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.07(b). The 
DGCL amendments involved no changes to the holdover rule. See DEL CODE ANN. § 141(b); Ferber, 
supra note 166; see also infra notes 175 & 333 and accompanying text; cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 10.22 (allowing company to adopt a shortened holdover period). 
 171. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006); COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 6. See supra note 
168 for the MBCA’s approach. 
 172. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, Committee on Corporate Laws Adopts Amendments to the 
Model Business Corporation Act Relating to Voting by Shareholders for the Election of Directors 2 
(June 20, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/nosearch/mbca/amendments/ 
release.pdf [hereinafter ABA Press Release]. 
 173. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22 (2006). 
 174. See id. 
 175. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22(a)–(b) (2006). In the ninety-day time period, the board may 
select another director to replace the nominee. Id. § 10.22(a)(2). If the board takes no action, the seat 
becomes vacant after ninety days. Id. § 10.22(a) cmt. Notably, the board may select “any qualified 
person, which could include a director who received more against than for votes” to fill the position. 
Id. § 10.22(a)(2)–(3) & cmt. (emphasis added). Thus, under section 10.22, a director not receiving a 
majority of the votes is elected but only for a ninety-day period, cutting short the otherwise-applicable 
holdover period. See id. § 10.22(a)(2). Finally, if the shareholders adopt the bylaw, only the 
shareholders can amend it, unless the bylaw is to the contrary. Id. § 10.22(c)(1). 
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elections.176 Previously, the Code required that directors be elected by a 
plurality of the votes.177 Effective on January 1, 2007, however, a 
corporation may amend its charter or bylaws to require that an incumbent 
director in an uncontested election must receive an affirmative majority of 
the shares voting at the meeting.178  
The majority-voting movement has seen rapid progress since 2005 and 
shows no signs of slowing.179 Still, there is still some opposition to the 
movement, albeit to a lesser extent than to the SEC’s Proposed Rule.180 
And even to the extent that majority voting may, in fact, “‘become 
universal,’”181 significant legal questions pertaining to the implementation 
of a majority-voting standard and how to allay the problems that plurality 
voting was designed to eliminate still exist.182 Debate on these issues 
between majority-voting proponents and skeptics persists even as the 
majority-voting movement continues to spread throughout corporate 
America.183 
V. WEIGHING THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: THE SHAREHOLDER ACCESS 
PROPOSAL VERSUS MAJORITY VOTING 
Since the vast majority of shareholder elections are uncontested and 
since, under a plurality-voting system, shareholders are unable to vote 
against incumbent directors, shareholders have virtually no say in the 
election of directors.184 To alleviate this problem,185 reformers have 
 
 
 176. Act of Sept. 30, 2006, Ch. 871, §§ 1, 2, 2006 Cal. Stat. Ch. 871 (codified at CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 708, 708.5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007) (effective Jan. 2007)); see also CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 108.5.  
 177. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 708 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007). 
 178. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 153, 708, 708.5.  
 179. See Baue, supra note 47. In fact, it is no longer implausible to say that majority voting will 
soon be the voting standard in place at all companies. See id. (“‘It appears that, given the high level of 
shareholder support, the strong commitment of influential institutional shareholders and institutional 
shareholder advisory services [such as ISS], and the lack of powerful opposition, majority voting will 
become universal.’”); see also supra Part IV.B.  
 180. See id.  
 181. Id. 
 182. See Deane, supra note 16, at 345 (noting that “the majority voting proposal raises a series of 
questions both substantive and technical”). In fact, the discrepancy between the number of companies 
using the Pfizer approach and the Intel approach is a demonstration of the diverging manners in which 
companies may attempt to institute changes facilitating shareholder participation in the director 
elections. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 183. ISS PAPER, supra note 16, at 4. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 135 & 137. 
 185. Though not all commentators agree on the level of participation shareholders should have in 
the governance of the corporation generally, even those who argue that limited shareholder voting 
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stressed two particular solutions. The first is increasing the number of 
contested elections to foster competition in the director-election process by 
making it easier for shareholders to nominate their own directors. This is 
the precise solution that the Proposed Rule sought to accomplish.186 The 
second is to give shareholders a way to vote against incumbents in 
uncontested elections—the goal of the majority-voting movement.187 An 
assessment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two 
potential solutions reveals why the majority-voting movement continues to 
gain momentum, while the Proposed Rule has now been buried.188 
A. The Shareholder Access Proposal: Too Problematic to Be Adopted 
The primary argument underlying the support for the Proposed Rule is 
a simple one: shareholders have very little say in the election of directors, 
and they need more.189 Essentially, supporters argue that input in the 
director-nomination process comes overwhelmingly from the nominating 
committee and very little from the shareholders.190 Further, they argue, 
shareholders have no opportunity to vote against unresponsive, ineffective 
directors due to plurality voting.191 Additionally, the alternative of 
mounting a proxy contest is generally infeasible due to prohibitive costs.192 
The result is that boards become “insulated”—feeling that they cannot be 
made to account for their actions.193 Subject to little accountability for 
their actions and decisions, directors become more inclined to exhibit 
“managerial slack.”194 Meanwhile, profits decline.195 Proponents posit, 
however, that stronger accountability measures, such as allowing 
shareholders to nominate alternate directors, would make “[d]irectors 
 
 
rights are appropriate still admit that shareholder participation in director elections is necessary as an 
accountability measure. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 627. 
 186. Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 47. 
 187. See Deane, supra note 16, at 339, 346. 
 188. See supra note 116. 
 189. See, e.g., Deane, supra note 16, at 337. 
 190. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
 191. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 77–79; see also Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 45. This 
argument may become less forceful in light of the SEC’s new internet proxy rules. See supra notes 43 
& 77. 
 193. Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 61–62. 
 194. Id. at 62. 
 195. Id. at 62–63. If the directors feel invulnerable to being ousted by shareholders, they may, for 
example, take actions that result in wastefully “higher consumption of private benefits.” This occurs, 
for instance, when directors approve excessive, lavish compensation packages for executives. Id. at 62. 
Professor Bebchuk argues, moreover, that the rules requiring independent directors do not necessarily 
solve the problems that result from board insulation. Id. at 63.  
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more accountable to shareholders” because they would “face the real risk 
of losing the election and thus their seat on the board.”196 
While the policy goal underlying the Proposed Rule—promoting 
democracy in shareholder elections—is laudable, if the rule creates more 
problems than it solves, then it is not worth adopting. Unfortunately, as 
opponents of the Proposed Rule have demonstrated, there are several 
compelling arguments against its adoption.197 First, opponents argue that 
the Proposed Rule implicates significant federalism concerns, since it 
attempts to regulate the internal governance of corporations—an area of 
law for which governance has been traditionally reserved to the states—
and thus may overstep the SEC’s rulemaking authority under Section 
14(a) of the Exchange Act to promulgate proxy rules.198 Thus, the 
Proposed Rule would have the effect of preempting state law on corporate-
governance issues.199 Second, opponents argue that, as a practical matter, 
only institutional investors can nominate directors under the Proposed 
Rule due to the five-percent-ownership requirement.200 They further argue 
that allowing institutional investors to so easily nominate directors could 
be problematic.201 Third, opponents state that the Proposed Rule will result 
 
 
 196. Deane, supra note 16, at 337. 
 197. See, e.g., DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 406–19; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 76–
94. 
 198. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 411. The landmark case of Business Roundtable v. SEC held 
that the regulation of issues of corporate governance was beyond the scope of SEC regulation under 
the Exchange Act, and included attempts to regulate the process of electing directors as an example of 
a corporate governance issue. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410–12 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 199. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 410–11 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 211–12 (2004)). 
 200. Id. at 412; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 67. 
 201. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 78–79; see also DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 417–
18. For example, one problem with allowing institutional investors to nominate directors is that their 
interests may not be the same as those of the shareholders at large. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 
34, at 78–79. For example, institutional investors may have a shorter investment horizon than other 
smaller shareholders (and thus may desire to elect directors who will undertake activities that are 
conducive to producing short-term profit), whereas other investors may have a more long-term 
perspective. See id. Another potentially divergent interest is that existing between certain institutional 
shareholders (such as public pension funds, labor unions, and other social activist organizations) with 
special-interest agendas pertaining to health care, global warming, and human rights issues, among 
others, and that of other shareholders, who would rather see the directors undertake profit-maximizing 
activities. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 78–79; Baue, supra note 93. Some opponents go so 
far as to say that the Proposed Rule could facilitate the election of special-interest directors catering to 
precisely those narrow interests. See DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 415–16 & n.303 (noting also the 
spate of special-interest shareholder proposals submitted to companies under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 
by “‘labor unions, grassroots organizations, and others traditionally categorized as gadflies’” (internal 
citations omitted)). Another reason institutional investors should not be exclusively allowed to 
nominate directors is that their expertise is assessing financial returns, not running the company. 
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 77. Finally, it is argued, even if institutional shareholders were 
given the power to nominate individual shareholders, the “Wall Street Rule” suggests that they might 
not even exercise it. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 413.  
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in the balkanization of boards and would thereby handicap their ability to 
effectively govern the corporation.202 Finally, they argue that the Proposed 
Rule is overkill in light of the recent regulations, which were some of the 
most comprehensive in history and which need to be given time to have an 
effect.203 
B. Majority Voting: Arguments For and Against 
Like the Proposed Rule, the majority-voting standard is a mechanism 
to make directors more accountable to shareholders.204 Majority voting is 
different from the Proposed Rule, however, in that majority voting does 
not allow shareholders to nominate directors; it merely allows them to 
affirmatively vote against unpalatable directors nominated by the 
company.205 Still, proponents argue that majority voting would represent a 
step toward engendering democracy in director elections by giving 
shareholders the power to cast out unresponsive directors—without the 
problems that the Proposed Rule creates.206 On the other hand, the critics 
 
 
 Thus, opponents argue that the nomination process is best left in the hands of directors, managers, 
and the nominating committee—all of whom know the business and are subject to a legally 
enforceable fiduciary duty of loyalty to the shareholders at large. In the exercise of their fiduciary duty 
to the shareholders, these constituents are forbidden from pursuing their own self-interested goals. 
Individual shareholders are not held to such a standard. Id. at 417–18. In the end, opponents argue that 
even if activism by large institutional investors is a positive development in the evolution of corporate 
governance, it is still not clear that institutional investors should have the power to nominate directors 
directly without first having to conduct a proxy contest. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 
76–79. Rather, they argue, there are distinct benefits to requiring shareholders who wish to nominate 
directors to wage a full-blown proxy contest. See id. at 88 (stating that requiring shareholders to 
conduct a proxy contest “allows [for] a level of scrutiny, disclosure and accountability that an insert in 
the company’s proxy statement is not able to provide”). 
 202. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 417. A shareholder-nominated director who is ultimately 
elected will likely butt heads with the other directors, and the collegiality of the board may be 
compromised. Id. Still, proponents of the rule respond that one of the problems precipitating the SEC’s 
promulgation of the Proposed Rule was precisely that boards were already too “collegial” and were 
refusing to ask management the “hard” questions. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 81. 
Opponents of the Proposed Rule respond that while it is true that an excess level of “collegiality” 
might be counterproductive to the board’s monitoring function, constant friction and inability to decide 
on important issues is equally damaging. Id. at 80–81. 
 203. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 363–64, 407, 415. These rules—including the Nominating 
Committee Rule, the SROs’ independence rules, and the requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley—are 
already targeted to reduce the insulation of directors and thus to make them more accountable to 
shareholders. Id. at 415.  
 204. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 9 & n.13. 
 205. Deane, supra note 16, at 340. 
 206. See supra text accompanying note 125; see also infra notes 208–20 and accompanying text. 
All references to the benefit of allowing shareholders to unelect unsatisfactory directors are qualified 
by the effects of the holdover rule. See supra note 133; see also infra note 275. 
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of majority voting argue primarily that majority voting presents 
implementation issues that proponents have not adequately addressed.207 
1. Arguments in Favor of Majority Voting 
Proponents of majority voting argue that, while the standard may not 
engender as much shareholder participation in director elections as the 
Proposed Rule, it still increases shareholder participation and does so 
without implicating the substantial concerns associated with the Proposed 
Rule.208 For example, majority-voting proponents argue that the majority-
voting rule is much simpler than the Proposed Rule.209 The dictate of 
majority voting is that if the votes that any director receives consist of fifty 
percent or more “for” votes, that director is reelected.210 It avoids the more 
complex, two-step process211 associated with the Proposed Rule and the 
issues surrounding which particular shareholders are “qualified” to place 
nominees on the proxy statement under the rule, as well as the propriety of 
allowing only certain large shareholders to nominate directors.212  
Moreover, majority voting avoids the federalism problems associated 
with the Proposed Rule.213 Whereas the Proposed Rule involves the federal 
government (via the SEC) stepping in to regulate matters of corporate 
governance, state law is the locus of the majority-voting movement.214 
State legislatures would be the ones to decide whether to discard the 
plurality-voting default rule and replace it with either a mandatory or 
default majority-voting rule, or, alternatively, to amend existing state law 
so as to make a majority-voting standard effective.215 But, another distinct 
advantage of majority voting is that extensive regulation is not required at 
all; rather, private companies (through their shareholders) may decide for 
themselves whether to adopt majority voting, and such a decision is 
 
 
 207. See infra Part V.B.3. 
 208. See Deane, supra note 16, at 345. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. The Proposed Rule requires one annual meeting to determine whether the triggering events 
have been satisfied in the first instance and then, at the next annual meeting, the shareholders are able 
to nominate directors on the company’s proxy statement. DeGaetano, supra note 10, at 396. By 
contrast, majority voting allows shareholders to vote out unsatisfactory directors in “one fell swoop”—
all within one election year, subject to the holdover rule. Deane, supra note 16, at 345. 
 212. See Deane, supra note 16, at 345. With majority voting, any shareholder who owns voting 
shares may register a vote “for” or “against” a director. See id. 
 213. Id. at 346. 
 214. Id. at 346–47. 
 215. Id. at 346. 
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possible because most states make plurality voting the default rule only.216 
The corporation then deals with the problems of implementation as it sees 
fit.217 Thus, no “one-size-fits-all [federal] rule” is imposed on all 
corporations.218 
A third point of differentiation between the controversial Proposed 
Rule and the majority-voting standard, proponents say, is that majority 
voting would be less likely to produce friction within the board of 
directors.219 The majority-voting standard would not create the 
balkanization effect associated with the Proposed Rule because 
shareholders do not nominate directors who would be more likely to come 
into conflict with incumbent directors.220 
In addition, advocates argue that majority voting—apart from its 
advantages over the Proposed Rule—is a desirable change in corporate 
governance because the policy underlying the plurality-voting standard is 
inapposite to the realities of today’s director elections.221 The concern of 
failed elections is not significant since most director elections are 
uncontested.222 
2. Arguments in Opposition to Majority Voting 
Though it does not appear that the majority-voting standard has caused 
nearly as much contention as the Proposed Rule, opposition to the change 
does exist—in many cases for reasons similar to those offered in 
opposition to the Proposed Rule. The primary arguments offered against 
the movement for majority voting, as well as proponents’ 
counterarguments, are discussed below. 
a. Superiority of Plurality Voting 
The first argument of majority-voting opponents is that plurality voting 
is a superior system.223 Plurality voting, they argue, sidesteps the problem 
 
 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. (quoting Ira S. Millstein, a senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, who 
commented that he supports majority voting because it “puts the responsibility back on the board”). 
 218. See id. at 338. 
 219. Id. at 346. 
 220. Id. (pointing out that the majority voting rule “forces consultation . . . [and] cooperation” and 
that “it avoids . . . confrontation”). Instead, shareholders vote against directors they find to be 
unsatisfactory to them, and the board itself will, in most cases, determine who is to fill the seat. See 
infra note 283 and accompanying text; see also infra note 289. 
 221. See Lesser, supra note 143. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 13. 
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of failed elections and therefore produces stability on the board.224 In 
addition, the plurality-voting system is simple and intelligible; it mandates 
that those directors receiving the most votes out of all the directors win, up 
to the number of seats.225 Further, the plurality-voting system is flexible 
and “works equally well with simple one-share-one-vote structures and 
with more complex capital structures, such as cumulative voting.”226 
b. Destabilization of the Board 
Beyond extolling the virtues of plurality voting, opponents also attempt 
to expose the vices of the majority-voting standard. The most significant 
problem, opponents say, is its potential to have a destabilizing effect on 
the board.227 If a director fails to receive a majority of the votes, a 
directorship seat may remain vacant on the board for a long period of time, 
as it may take more than a year to find a director with the right fit.228 It 
may also cause the board to fail to maintain certain stock-exchange listing 
requirements and regulatory mandates.229 For example, the NYSE now 
requires the majority of the directors on the board to be independent of the 
company, and if shareholders vote out one of the independent directors, 
 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 13–14. 
 226. Id. at 14. Even some majority-voting proponents suggest that, where a company provides for 
cumulative voting in director elections, a majority-voting standard is unnecessary because cumulative 
voting “provides unique leverage to permit a minority of shareholders to have an influence on board 
composition.” Id. at 18. For example, newly enacted section 10.22 of the MBCA, see supra notes 172–
75 and accompanying text, is only available to those companies that do not already provide for 
cumulative voting. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22(a) (2006). However, other majority-voting 
proponents argue that cumulative voting—though it does give minority shareholders greater voting 
power than they would have otherwise—does so only in contested elections, where majority voting is 
not applicable anyway. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 31. Thus, in uncontested 
elections, where cumulative voting either does not apply or does not give shareholders any greater 
power because they can only cumulate votes for incumbent directors, majority voting is still necessary 
to give shareholders an effective voice in the election. Id.; see also ED DURKIN, EFFECTS OF 
CONTESTED ELECTIONS AND CUMULATIVE VOTING ON COMPANIES ELECTING DIRECTORS BY 
MAJORITY VOTE 3 (2006), http://cii.org/majority/ (click on “Ed Durkin’s answers to questions on 
majority voting, contested elections and cumulative voting”) (stating that the ABA’s assertion that 
majority voting should not be applied to companies with cumulative voting is faulty, as cumulative 
voting only applies in contested elections).  
 In addition, proponents of majority voting would probably respond that the arguments espousing 
the flexibility and simplicity of plurality voting are not persuasive in any case. Majority-voting 
proponents argue, for example, that the majority-voting rule is also “simple” and makes intuitive 
sense. Deane, supra note 16, at 345. Moreover, as described below, majority-voting proponents state 
that, although there may be some complexities involved in the implementation of the standard, these 
challenges can be addressed. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 276–80, 282–83. 
 227. Deane, supra note 16, at 348. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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the ratio of independent to total directors may fall short of NYSE 
requirements and cause the company to risk being delisted from the 
exchange.230  
Proponents respond to these arguments by stating that the majority-
voting standard does not have to be so inflexible as to produce changes on 
the board that “range from disruptive to debilitating.”231 For example, the 
Intel standard (a true majority-voting standard) gives the board the 
discretion to choose whether to accept a director’s resignation following 
his or her failure to receive a majority of the votes, providing the board 
with the requisite level of flexibility to avoid calamity.232 If the board were 
to determine that a particular director, unelected due to his failure to 
receive a majority of votes, was indispensable to the functioning of the 
board,233 the board could choose to reject the director’s tendered 
resignation.234 Then, by operation of the holdover rule, which continues to 
exist under most state corporate laws—even those which have been 
recently amended to allow companies to more easily implement majority-
voting standards—the director, though unelected, would continue to serve 
on the board.235 Thus, the risk that a majority-voting standard would 
 
 
 230. Id. New NYSE rules require that at least half of the directors on the board be independent. 
See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. In addition, the new SRO rules require fully 
independent nominating, audit, and compensation committees. Id. If one of the independent directors 
who serves on the committee fails to be reelected, the committee may fall short of having the requisite 
number of independent directors. Id. Also, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires audit committees to have 
at least one “financial expert.” Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 90. If the director failing to 
receive a majority of the votes were the financial expert, the audit committee could not function. 
Deane, supra note 16, at 348. 
 231. Deane, supra note 16, at 348 (quoting Richard Alsop, First Vice President & General Counsel 
of Corporate Law at Merrill Lynch). 
 232. See supra note 158. In addition, though not representing a true majority-voting approach, the 
Pfizer-styled director-resignation policies also, of course, provide the board with sufficient flexibility. 
See Baue, supra note 47. Proponents of majority voting respond that such flexibility substantially 
reduces the force of detractors’ other arguments regarding the litany of devastating consequences that 
would attend adoption of majority voting. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 7. Such cited 
consequences include breaches of executive employment agreements in place due to failure of the 
executives to be reelected as directors, thereby triggering costly severance payments; “‘changes of 
control’” that might be triggered by failure to “elect a specified percentage of directors” under certain 
credit agreements; or the enlargement of a dissident shareholder’s representation on the board when a 
director representing another group fails to be elected. See id. (listing other adverse consequences as 
well). Proponents of majority voting state that directors will have the ability to consider these negative 
consequences when deciding whether to accept a nominee’s resignation under either the Pfizer or the 
Intel standard, thereby allaying the disasters opponents claim majority voting would produce. See 
COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 4–5. 
 233. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 234. See COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 2.  
 235. See id. at 2, 5. For a more detailed analysis of the issues that the holdover rule creates 
through its interaction with the majority-voting standard, see infra notes 274–85 and accompanying 
text. 
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produce the myriad disruptions that attend board vacancies is not a 
significant one.236  
c. Stripping the Withhold Vote of its Significance 
Another point of opposition is that the majority-voting standard guts 
the force of the withhold vote to express shareholder dissatisfaction.237 
Assuming that the withhold vote on the proxy card of a company whose 
cards contain “for” or “withhold” options would function as an “against” 
vote under a majority-voting standard, withhold votes would no longer be 
the “powerful symbols that express shareholder dissatisfaction and drive 
governance reform.”238 And, opponents argue, boards already take cues 
from withhold votes seriously—if not for the reason that the board wishes 
to restore the shareholders’ confidence in their ability to run the 
corporation then for the reason that the negative publicity associated with 
 
 
 236. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 8–10; but see infra notes 287–89 (describing 
how majority voting can lead to vacancies and therefore could, in certain instances, create some of the 
problems associated with vacancies). In addition, proponents state that, in any case, even under a 
majority-voting standard, it is not especially likely that any director will actually receive a majority of 
“against” votes. See Deane, supra note 16, at 341. As an example in practice, proponents point to 
Lockheed Martin Corp. Id. Lockheed Martin has a majority-voting standard in place—a rigorous one, 
in fact, requiring that directors earn not simply a majority of the votes cast for or against them but a 
majority of all votes outstanding, irrespective of whether they are voted in the election. Id. Proponents 
point out that a “vote-no” campaign waged by the AFL-CIO against one Lockheed Martin director, 
Frank Savage, still did not result in his removal even under the rigorous majority-voting standard, 
because the company’s board “persuaded shareholders that Savage made a real contribution to their 
board and was therefore worth keeping.” Id. Proponents of majority voting cite this event as an 
example of how majority voting can encourage directors and shareholders to work together to 
eliminate—rather than ignore—shareholder dissatisfaction. See id. They argue, therefore, that majority 
voting will not be the handicap on corporations that opponents make it out to be. See id. at 341–42. 
 Certain opponents respond to these counterarguments, stating that if the board retains such ample 
discretion to keep unelected directors on the board, majority voting is really just plurality voting 
“under a different name” and is not worth the effort expended debating it; the fact that the director was 
not technically “elected” is just semantics. Id. at 348. Proponents respond that when a director fails to 
be elected under a majority-voting system and the board chooses to allow the director to stay (by 
rejecting the resignation offer), the board must justify its decision to retain that unelected director. Id. 
at 346 (remarking that if a director fails to be elected due to receiving an insufficient number of votes, 
“the board then has to do something” and that “[a]ny board that didn’t do anything . . . would be 
idiotic”). The virtue of the majority-voting standard, then, is “the incentive [it provides for the board] 
to work with shareholders to find a mutually acceptable solution” to shareholders’ perceived problems 
with the board’s management of the corporation. Id. The standard puts substantial “pressure on boards 
to negotiate a solution with dissenting shareholders.” Id. Thus, the majority-voting standard is not just 
plurality voting under a different name. See id.  
 237. Deane, supra note 16, at 350–51. 
 238. Id. at 350. As Joseph Grundfest envisioned in his 1993 article, shareholders under a plurality-
voting standard have the ability to inject power into the withhold vote by organizing “just vote no” 
campaigns, in which shareholders withhold votes en masse from unresponsive directors to signal their 
dissatisfaction. See generally Grundfest, supra note 15. 
Washington University Open Scholarship











the board’s receipt of a substantial number of withhold votes can be 
damaging to the company.239 By taking away the possibility of exercising 
a withhold vote in uncontested elections, shareholders will be left with the 
stark choice between voting directly “for” or directly “against” a particular 
director, when shareholders may just want to use the withhold vote as a 
symbol that they are not happy with the current direction of the 
company.240 
d. Unintended Consequences 
Opponents further argue that the majority-voting standard may give 
rise to unintended consequences in light of a possible change in a NYSE 
rule pertaining to the voting of shares held of record by brokers.241 Under 
the so-called “broker nonvote rule,” a broker may vote the shares of the 
beneficial owner on routine, ordinary matters, such as director elections, if 
the beneficial owner provided the broker with no voting instructions.242 
Typically, brokers vote these shares (i.e., broker nonvotes) in favor of the 
incumbent directors.243 However, the new rule being contemplated by the 
NYSE would prevent corporations from counting such uninstructed votes 
for director nominees.244 Such a change could result in a substantially 
reduced number of “for” votes being cast for incumbents at the meeting.245 
Thus, the effects of this rule change, in conjunction with the possible 
increased use of the “against” vote by even those shareholders who are 
only marginally dissatisfied, could increase the incidence of directors’ 
failing to be elected.246  
An additional unintended consequence is that majority voting might 
deter directors from serving on corporate boards due to the risk of not 
 
 
 239. See Grundfest, supra note 15, at 866. 
 240. Deane, supra note 16, at 350, 362 n.41. However, note that it may well be possible for a 
company adopting majority voting to have “for,” “against,” and “withhold” vote options on the proxy 
card. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 18. The “for” and “against” votes would presumably 
be the only ones counted in determining whether the director received a majority vote. See id. at 18–
19, 19 n.28. The withhold vote could still function as an abstention—and thus perhaps still a symbol of 
a shareholder’s general dissatisfaction with a particular candidate. See id. at 18–19. If such voting 
options are possible, then the majority-voting system arguably allows shareholders to express an even 
wider range of opinions on the performance of the directors by way of the corporate vote. See id. 
 241. NYSE Group, Inc., NYSE Rule 452 (2007), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/ 
NYSE_Rules/ (click on “Operation of Member Organizations”); COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 6. 
 242. See supra note 124. 
 243. See supra note 124. 
 244. COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 7. 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. 
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being elected, which all directors would face under a majority-voting 
standard.247 Since the Enron, WorldCom, and other major corporate 
scandals during 2001–02, directors already must cope with a host of 
increased responsibilities and pressures and also face an increased risk of 
personal liability due to errors.248 Thus, directors may be less willing to 
serve on boards if they feel as though they can be subject to an 
embarrassing removal at the whim of shareholders, who may vote against 
a particular director for any number of reasons not necessarily related to 
that director’s effective management of the corporation.249 
e. Majority Voting Is Not Necessary 
An additional contention is that the majority-voting overhaul is 
unnecessary in light of the already-improving landscape of American 
corporate governance and the mechanisms already in place which allow 
shareholders to voice their opinions in an effective but nonintrusive 
manner.250 First, opponents state that the legislation and regulations passed 
to deal with the corporate scandals have already sought to address several 
of the problems relating to directors and board nominations.251 They 
further claim that these regulations need to be given a chance to prove 
their effectiveness before burdening the board with additional governance 
measures to implement.252  
Second, they argue that shareholders already have multiple ways to 
express their dissatisfaction with company boards through methods they 
can and do use.253 For example, shareholders may make precatory 
resolutions under Rule 14a-8,254 vote against management’s proposals at 
the annual meeting, make public statements that impugn the directors’ 
 
 
 247. Deane, supra note 16, at 348–49. 
 248. Id. at 348. 
 249. See id. at 348; see also supra note 201 (describing special-interest shareholders’ votes). 
 250. Id. at 349–50; see also supra note 203 and accompanying text (arguing that the Proposed 
Rule was unnecessary for similar reasons). 
 251. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 92–93. In particular, the newly enacted 
Nominating Committee Rule requires disclosures that increase the transparency of the process that a 
company’s nominating committee uses to select director candidates, thereby “enhanc[ing] the ability 
of major shareholders to provide meaningful input into the nomination process.” Id. at 92.  
 252. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 14–15. 
 253. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 69 (discussing arguments relating to Proposed 
Rule but applicable here as well). 
 254. Opponents further argue that directors already face significant consequences if they ignore 
precatory proposals that are passed by a majority vote. In so doing, the board is likely to receive 
significant criticism, and ISS may recommend to its institutional investor clients that those investors 
withhold their votes from the unyielding directors. See Shareholder Proposals: What You Need to 
Know, supra note 108.  
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management abilities, speak privately with management regarding their 
concerns, and suggest to the nominating committee a director candidate, 
whom the nominating committee must consider in accord with its 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the company.255 They may also 
withhold support for directors with whom they are dissatisfied.256 
Opponents state that shareholders have taken and continue to take 
advantage of each of these opportunities.257 
Third, they argue that corporations have already made significant 
headway in improving the lines of communication between directors and 
shareholders.258 Directors have seriously considered the issues that 
shareholders have found most bothersome and are generally working to 
resolve them.259 For example, boards of many corporations have already 
begun to declassify their boards.260 Shareholder activists observe that 
board classification, by allowing directors to escape reelection each year, 
leads to the entrenchment of the board and the managers, as well as 
reduced accountability to shareholders.261 Notably, however, companies 
have been voluntarily moving to declassify boards in an effort to appease 
shareholders.262 Some opponents argue that the move toward majority 
voting may stop the trend toward declassification of the boards, as the 
increased risk of failing to be reelected under a majority-voting standard 
would weigh heavily against the board’s voluntary adoption of yet another 
insulation-reducing governance device.263  
As a final argument, opponents cite the fact that dissatisfied 
shareholders may always sell their shares.264 Thus, shareholders can bring 
market pressures to bear on a derelict board by driving down the stock 
price and subjecting the firm to the possibility of a hostile takeover.265  
To these various arguments, proponents of majority voting would 
likely respond that the opponents’ cited “solutions” have long existed and 
have not been effective in providing shareholders an active voice in the 
 
 
 255. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 69.  
 256. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 15–16. 
 257. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 69, 92–94. 
 258. See Deane, supra note 16, at 350–51. 
 259. See id. 
 260. Id. at 351. See supra note 37 for a description of board declassification. 
 261. See supra note 37. Classification is expressly allowed under certain states’ corporate statutes, 
including Delaware’s. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2006). 
 262. Deane, supra note 16, at 351. 
 263. Id. 
 264. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 16.  
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65. However, note the problems associated with 
hostile takeovers, described above. See supra text accompanying notes 70–73. 
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direction of their companies.266 Many of the mechanisms cited as 
alternatives to majority voting have no legal force.267 For example, 
precatory resolutions under Rule 14a-8 merely allow shareholders to ask 
that the board consider a certain proposal; even if the proposal receives a 
majority vote, the board may, without liability, decide not to implement 
it.268 Moreover, though the nominating committee has a fiduciary duty to 
make decisions that are in the best interest of the corporation, the 
nominating committee routinely recommends incumbents for nomination, 
and the board itself still has the final say over who ultimately gets 
nominated.269 Therefore, even post reform, shareholders still have no 
additional legal mechanisms (other than the proxy contest) to participate in 
director elections. 
Proponents of the Intel-styled majority-voting standard also 
counterargue that while Pfizer-styled director-resignation policies are a 
step in the right direction, they insufficiently protect the voice of the 
shareholders in director elections.270 Director-resignation polices are just 
that—policies. They are not binding bylaws, so the board may change 
them at any time.271 Thus, the Intel standard, which is enshrined in a bylaw 
amendment, manifests a permanence that Pfizer’s informal “corporate 
governance policy” does not.272 
 
 
 266. See, e.g., Deane, supra note 16, at 338, 342. 
 267. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposals: What You Need to Know, supra note 108. Further, though 
opponents glibly claim that shareholders can speak to management about their concerns, these 
“discussions” have no legal force, as it is the board that makes the company’s business decisions. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)(2006). 
 268. See supra note 108; see also Posting by Stephen Bainbridge on ProfessorBainbridge.com, 
Today’s Shareholder Access Post: What About That Third Trigger?, http://www.businessassociations 
blog.com/2003/11/todays_shareholder_access_post_what_about_that_third_trigger/ (Nov. 11, 2003) 
(stating that the board’s decision not to implement a precatory resolution is protected by the business 
judgment rule). 
 269. See supra note 101. Further, the same agency problems discussed in connection with the 
divergent interests of managers and shareholders also apply to the interests between the directors on 
the nominating committee and shareholders. See Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 57. 
 270. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 32. 
 271. See Nathan, supra note 158, at 4–5. Moreover, with the recent amendments to Delaware law 
and the MBCA, ensuring that the board cannot unilaterally amend shareholder-adopted bylaw 
amendments pertaining to director elections, see supra note 171 and accompanying text, proponents 
are correct to assert that director-resignation policies “may be altered with relative ease” when 
compared with bylaw amendments. COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 4. 
 272. See COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 4–5. 
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3. Implementation Problems Associated with Majority Voting: Dealing 
with the Holdover Rules and Preventing Board Vacancies 
Even granting that majority voting, in principle, is a positive step in 
terms of fostering more meaningful shareholder participation in director 
elections, skeptics cite various problems of implementation. Perhaps the 
greatest point of contention in the majority-voting movement is how to 
implement the voting standard so that it may be made effective under the 
existing statutory scheme of the state in which the company is 
incorporated.273 In particular, the most difficult of these issues to resolve is 
how to square the majority-voting standard with the states’ holdover 
rules.274 Opponents of majority voting ask what the purpose of a majority-
voting standard is if directors who fail to receive a majority of the votes 
still hold over as directors and serve at least until the next election 
anyway.275 
There are several solutions, however, to dealing with the problems the 
holdover rule creates. First, and perhaps most obviously, states could 
eliminate the holdover rule to facilitate the implementation of majority-
voting proposals.276 However, eliminating the holdover rule may be 
imprudent.277 The holdover rule serves a useful purpose; it ensures that 
directors who fail to win an election are not immediately removed from 
their positions and that the corporation will not be subject to immediate 
vacancies.278 Moreover, if a majority of the directors failed to be elected, 
the directors’ holding over might prevent an undesirable takeover.279 Thus, 
wholesale elimination of the holdover rule does not seem appropriate.280 
In keeping with these observations, it seems that most majority-voting 
proponents do not necessarily advocate the elimination of the holdover 
rule.281 Instead, they argue that director-resignation policies adopted in 
 
 
 273. See, e.g., Deane, supra note 16, at 345–46. 
 274. See, e.g., CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 7–8. For a description of the 
“holdover rule,” see supra note 133. 
 275. See supra note 133 (explaining how state statutes provide that a director who is unelected 
continues to hold over in her position until she resigns, she is removed, or her successor is elected and 
is qualified). 
 276. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 8. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. 
 279. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 22 (discussing how failed elections expose 
companies to hostile takeover). 
 280. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 8–9. 
 281. See, e.g., id. Some proponents, such as ISS, for example, do suggest sweeping modifications 
to the existing holdover rules. Letter from Stephen Deane, Vice President, Inst’l S’holder Serv., to the 
Honorable E. Norman Veasey, Chair, Comm. on Corp. Laws, Am. Bar Ass’n 4–5 (Aug. 15, 2005), 
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conjunction with majority voting will allow the corporation to give effect 
to the shareholders’ vote without unduly handicapping the corporation’s 
ability to deal with unexpected and possibly unwarranted shareholder 
votes and what would otherwise be immediate director vacancies.282 Under 
 
 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/ISSCommentLetteronABAMajorityElectionsPaper.pdf [hereinafter ISS 
Letter]. ISS maintains that the holdover rule should keep unelected directors in office only in certain 
specific situations, such as when that director’s leaving would cause the board to violate the SRO 
independence standards. Id. 
 282. See CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 9–10. Director-resignation policies are 
essential to the operation of majority-voting standards because directors cannot remove other directors 
under either Delaware law or the MBCA; that power is specifically reserved to shareholders. See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2006) (stating that stockholders have the power to remove directors); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08 (2006) (same). Therefore, without a resignation policy in place, 
following a particular director’s failure to receive a majority of the votes, the remaining directors 
would be powerless to unilaterally remove the holdover director if the holdover director refused to 
voluntarily resign. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k). Though the board (or shareholders, if 
authorized by the charter or bylaws) could call a special meeting to remove the director via a 
stockholder vote even without a resignation policy in place, enough shareholders would have to be 
present at the meeting or their votes represented by proxies in order to effectuate the removal, 
requiring shareholders to essentially vote again to remove the director they already voted not to elect. 
§§ 141(k), 211(a)(2), 211(d); CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 8, 15, 18; see also MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08. It is also true that, following an election in which one or more directors failed 
to be elected, the board may nominate another director candidate to replace the holdover director and 
call a special meeting where the shareholders may vote on the new candidate (who would replace the 
holdover director if the new nominee were elected by a majority of the outstanding votes). See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). However, doing so is expensive, ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, 
at 21, and it takes time to find replacement directors. David Morrison & Elizabeth Cates, Majority 
Versus Plurality Voting in the Election of Directors (Fulbright & Jaworski LLP), Oct. 2005, at 4, 
http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub_id=2018&site_id=494&deta
il=yes (click “view as PDF”). 
 There is, however, another potential problem with the notion of using the director-resignation 
policy to cut off the holdover period for a holdover director. The problem is that the board also does 
not have the power to force directors to tender, before the annual meeting, a contingent resignation in 
the first instance. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k); see also CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, 
app. B at 19 (noting that “guidelines or bylaw amendments” asking for resignations “would not create 
a legal right for a board to remove a director”). However, it is now clear that the DGCL and the 
MBCA, each as amended, make resignations conditioned on receipt of an insufficient number of “for” 
votes enforceable, meaning that such resignations could be tendered before the election but 
conditioned on the election results; still, they first must be voluntarily submitted. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, §141(b); see also CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 19. The board still has options, 
however, if a director refused to submit such a resignation in advance of the meeting. For example, the 
nominating committee could, at the urging of the board, choose not to nominate the obstinate director 
at the next annual meeting, forcing that director to wage an expensive proxy contest for his own 
election just as any other shareholder wishing to nominate a director would. See supra note 101 
(describing the function of the nominating committee) and notes 107–10 and accompanying text 
(explaining how the Proposed Rule would have allowed shareholders whose candidates were not 
nominated by the nominating committee to wage a proxy contest within the company’s proxy 
statement, but the Proposed Rule was not adopted). However, such an effort by that director would 
likely be in vain once the shareholders learned of the reason for his failure to be renominated. See CII-
NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 19 (noting that these resignation “procedures might give a 
director a greater impetus to resign”). Thus, even though the board may not force all directors to 
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the Intel approach, for example, directors can apprise the reasons behind 
the shareholder vote, and if they conclude that the director is too valuable 
to the company and that the shareholders’ voting decision was an 
unreasonable one, the board may allow the director to continue serving as 
a holdover director by rejecting his or her tendered resignation.283 
However, under a majority-voting standard, a board that chooses to retain 
an unelected director as a holdover director by rejecting his resignation 
 
 
submit contingent resignations in compliance with a director-resignation policy, it seems that the 
likelihood that a director would resist the submission of a contingent resignation is small. See id. 
 If the company did not require submissions of director resignations in advance of the election, and 
a certain director was not elected but refused to tender a resignation following the vote (and a special 
meeting to remove him or replace him would be too costly), the worst-case scenario might be to 
simply allow the director to hold over for the remainder of the period, which would be only one year, 
and then ask the nominating committee not to renominate him or her. See id. at 17–18. 
 283. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 19. If the board rejects the resignation, the 
director can always then submit an unconditional resignation, which the board must accept, if he really 
wants to leave his position. Id.  
 On the other hand, if the board after due consideration determines that the director should be 
removed, it can accept the resignation. Id. After acceptance of the resignation, the board can call a 
special meeting for the shareholders to elect a new director, it can eliminate the vacant seat, or it can 
simply permit a vacancy which may then be filled as explained below. See id. at 20–21; see also infra 
note 289. 
 Under the Pfizer approach, too, the board would be empowered to accept or reject the tendered 
resignation of a director who received more withhold votes than “for” votes. See supra text 
accompanying notes 152–54. However, because under the Pfizer approach plurality voting still 
applies, that director would still be elected (as only one vote is required to elect a director under 
plurality voting) and so would not be a holdover director. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
The distinction between an elected director holding office (the result under the Pfizer approach when 
the director fails to receive a majority of the votes) and a holdover director (the result under the Intel 
approach) with respect to powers, duties, and the ability to participate in decisions, however, appears 
to be nil. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 14–15 (noting that holdover directors can 
participate in board decisions to the same extent as elected directors).  
 This conclusion raises the question of what, then, is the difference between the Pfizer and Intel 
standards if, in either case, a director failing to receive a majority of the votes stays on after the 
election and, in either case, the decision to end the director’s term (via accepting the resignation 
submitted) is within the discretion of the board. In truth, the differences are slight. See Nathan, supra 
note 158, at 2. Perhaps the most substantial difference is that Pfizer-styled standards are mere policy 
adoptions, whereas Intel-styled standards involve bylaw amendments. Id. at 4 (stating that “a decision 
to implement full-fledged majority voting cannot be made by board policy” and that “[i]t must be 
embedded in a by-law or certificate of incorporation”). Another distinction is that true majority-voting 
standards cause unsatisfactory directors to actually fail to be elected, giving the shareholders’ votes a 
“stronger moral effect” and “‘legal effect’” since the director was not legally elected. Id. at 2. Thus, if 
the board rejects the director’s resignation, the board is actually allowing an unelected director to stay 
on the board whereas, under the Pfizer standard, rejecting the director’s resignation amounts to simply 
ignoring the elected director’s receipt of a majority of withhold votes, which are legally insignificant 
anyway. See id.; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text. A final difference is that true 
majority-voting standards will require that board-nominated candidates who had not previously served 
on the board obtain a majority of the votes or else not serve on the board at all, as the holdover rules do 
not apply to those who were not already incumbent directors. See Nathan, supra note 158, at 2. 
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presumably will have to justify that decision to the shareholders.284 Thus, 
the majority-voting regime ensures that the board’s decision whether or 
not to accept a director’s resignation is subject to shareholder scrutiny.285 
One final consideration in adopting the majority-voting standard is its 
potential to increase the incidence of board vacancies following 
elections.286 Though, at first glance, it may seem that the operation of the 
holdover rule would protect the board from immediate and unexpected 
vacancies in all instances where certain directors failed to receive a 
majority of the votes, it will not do so in at least one instance: when one of 
the board-nominated candidates for a director position is not an incumbent 
and the director formerly filling the seat has already abdicated her 
position.287 A nonincumbent candidate is not subject to the operation of 
 
 
 284. CII-NACD Report, supra note 48, app. B at 27. If the elected directors on the board decide 
not to give the shareholders’ vote due consideration, or (worse yet) ignore it completely and take no 
steps to find a new director to replace the unelected one, they will “likely exacerbate the underlying 
cause of shareholder dissent” and thereby possibly effect “a public struggle between the company and 
its shareholders.” Id. Shareholders might as a result conduct a proxy contest to nominate a full new 
slate of directors to replace such unresponsive ones, see supra text accompanying note 76, or they 
might bring suit against the directors for breaches of their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, see 
supra note 57 and accompanying text. And, even though proxy contests are costly and not frequently 
waged, one might surmise that a proxy contest would be more likely to erupt in the face of such blatant 
disregard of the shareholders’ vote. See CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 27. On the other 
hand, if the elected directors truly believed that the nonelected director was an invaluable asset to the 
corporation, then it would be likely that the directors would attempt to work out a deal with the 
shareholders rather than simply ignore their wishes. See Deane, supra note 16, at 354. 
 Were the board to fail to partake in such negotiations with the shareholders and to choose instead 
to reject the resignation without deliberation, it is unlikely that such a decision would be upheld under 
the business judgment rule. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The business judgment rule 
protects only those decisions made “on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a decision 
would fail to meet that standard. Even if the board could produce sufficient evidence to show that its 
decision was reasonably informed, a shareholder plaintiff might still be able to show that the bad faith 
actuated the board’s decision. Further, it is not entirely clear that the business judgment rule would 
automatically apply in this situation anyway. Cf. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 
659–60 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that “the ordinary considerations to which the business judgment rule 
originally responded are simply not present in the shareholder voting context”). Blasius distinguished 
ordinary business decisions, over which directors have discretion, from “matter[s] of internal corporate 
governance,” suggesting that power over the latter may be constrained by the directors’ agency duties 
to their principal, the shareholders. See id. This issue could be the subject of another note entirely. For 
present purposes, it is enough to say that a true majority-voting policy significantly constrains the 
board’s discretion to whimsically ignore shareholder voting results under a majority-voting standard. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See CII REPORT, supra note 48, at 9–10.  
 287. Id. at 9. Such a condition can occur in an uncontested election when, for example, an 
incumbent director resigns before the election but where the resignation is effective as of the meeting 
date. The board may then nominate another candidate for the seat. Though that candidate is board 
nominated (and the election uncontested), the candidate is not an “incumbent” because the candidate 
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the holdover rule.288 Therefore, if one or more of the nonincumbent 
director candidates failed to receive a majority of the votes, he or she 
would not be elected, the holdover rule would not apply, and there would 
be an immediate vacancy on the board.289 Still, because board-nominated 
candidates are usually incumbents,290 the holdover rule will operate to 
prevent vacancies in most instances. Thus, the possibility of increased 
vacancies due to majority voting is not an especially acute problem.291 
VI. PROPOSAL 
A company’s board of directors plays a pivotal role in a corporation’s 
governance since state corporate laws vest directors with wide discretion 
to make decisions of fundamental importance to the functioning of the 
corporation.292 The board decides the amount of compensation to be paid 
to the company’s key executives, retains the authority to replace those 
executives, and has the ability to initiate or block (as the case may be) 
 
 
has not yet served on the board. Cf. ABA DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 34, at 26 (applying the 
analysis to nonincumbent directors in a “modified plurality” context).  
 288. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2006). The holdover rule states that “director[s] shall hold 
office” until resignation, removal, or appointment of a successor. Id. (emphasis added). A 
nonincumbent candidate is not a “director.” See CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 9–10 
(distinguishing between the impact of the holdover rule on an incumbent nominee (i.e., resulting in a 
holdover) and a nonincumbent nominee (i.e., resulting in a vacancy)).  
 289. See CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 9; see also Deane, supra note 16, at 348. 
Under the DGCL, a vacancy on the board is filled per the bylaws; if the bylaws are silent, the board 
fills the vacancy. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(e) (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.10 (2006) 
(vacancy filled by board or shareholders, unless charter provides otherwise). Vacancies—especially 
multiple vacancies—can create problems in the functioning of the corporation, such as causing the 
corporation to fail to meet stock-exchange listing requirements, quorum requirements, SEC 
requirements pertaining to board committee constituency, and others. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 
48, app. B at 22. The Pfizer standard does not create a risk of vacancy because even a nonincumbent 
director will be legally elected so long as she receives one or more “for” votes. However, while not 
creating a risk of vacancy, the Pfizer standard is undesirable because it guarantees the election of 
nonincumbent candidates who may have no track record with the company or no experience in 
managing a corporation. See COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 5. The fact that the board may also hold 
a resignation of the majority-withheld director does not alleviate this problem, since the board has the 
discretion in deciding whether or not to accept the resignation. Id. at 3–4. 
 290. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
 291. See CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 9. As explained above, a vacancy as an 
immediate result of the election occurs only when an incumbent has resigned on the day of (or 
effective as of) the election, leaving the seat vacant, and the nominee to replace the departed director is 
a nonincumbent. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. Such an occurrence is not especially 
likely. CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 9–10. In addition, in order to avoid even this 
unlikely occurrence, the board can ask that the departing director resign before the date of the election, 
which creates a vacancy that the board can fill with the proposed new nominee. ABA DISCUSSION 
PAPER, supra note 34, at 26. Then the new nominee becomes an incumbent, and the holdover rule will 
apply if he is not elected. Id.  
 292. See supra text accompanying note 29; supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
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significant corporate transactions such as mergers, dissolutions, and the 
payment of dividends.293 Therefore, it is not difficult to see why 
shareholders, who surrender their capital to the firm and entrust its 
management to the board, should have some say over who sits on that 
board. In fact, while shareholders generally retain very little control over 
the individual decisions that the board and the officers of the corporation 
routinely make, the quintessential right attaching to the common 
shareholder’s stock is voting in an election of the board of directors.294 
Such accountability on the part of directors is a necessary concomitant to 
the control paradigm of the corporation, which divests the equity owners 
of control over the “business and affairs” of the corporation.295  
Though corporate governance has of late received increased attention, 
and though some of the recent laws and rules enacted to prevent future 
Enron-like frauds have targeted boards of public companies,296 the process 
of electing directors of corporations under state law has remained the 
same. The typical director election process is a mere formality: the 
incumbent directors nominate themselves for board positions,297 and the 
shareholders—rather than nominating their own candidates, which would 
require an expensive proxy contest—vote on whether to reelect the 
incumbents.298 
The majority-voting standard serves as a partial fix to the marked 
imbalance of power between the board and shareholders in director 
elections. While not allowing shareholders to nominate their own 
candidates, majority voting allows shareholders to register an affirmative 
vote against unresponsive, ineffective directors.299 Majority voting would 
displace the prevailing plurality-voting system, under which shareholders 
 
 
 293. See supra note 32. 
 294. See supra text accompanying notes 33 & 37. 
 295. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
 296. See supra text accompanying notes 95–103. 
 297. See supra note 101; see also supra text accompanying note 107. 
 298. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. It might be argued that the costs of waging proxy 
contests may be substantially reduced in light of the SEC’s recent adoption of its internet proxy rules, 
and therefore, shareholders may wage contests more frequently. See supra note 77. If shareholders can 
wage proxy contests with relative ease, there is less of a need for a change to majority voting. See 
supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. Still, the internet proxy rules reduce only the costs of proxy 
distribution; the costs of solicitation and legal fees (e.g., in preparation of the proxy statement) remain 
the same. See supra note 77. Moreover, because there are still costs to waging proxy contests, the 
collective action problem described above may still work to inhibit the frequency of proxy contests. 
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Finally, even if proxy contests do arise more frequently, 
such is not an argument against the principle of increasing shareholder participation that underlies 
majority voting, which would give shareholders at those companies not experiencing proxy contests an 
effective way to combat the collective action problem and let their voices be heard.  
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 125–26. 
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can tender withhold votes to signal their dissatisfaction but cannot legally 
vote against unsatisfactory directors.300 This voting schematic also avoids 
the thorny issues associated with the SEC’s Shareholder Access Proposal, 
which arguably would have vested shareholders with too much power and 
possibly have created balkanized boards mired in conflict, thereby 
rendering them unable to function effectively.301 Thus, the virtue of the 
majority-voting movement is that it gives shareholders a concrete and 
effective way of making directors accountable and at the same time, due to 
the states’ holdover rules, does not deprive the board of the flexibility and 
maneuverability it needs to run the corporation. 
Majority voting is quickly becoming a widespread phenomenon,302 but 
it still has its detractors.303 At bottom, these opponents articulate two 
primary arguments against the movement.304 The first is that a majority-
voting standard is unnecessary because of recent corporate governance 
advances, including laws (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and new rules 
(such as the SEC’s Nominating Committee Rule) which already provide 
shareholders additional protection against director malfeasance.305 This 
argument, however, fails to appreciate the problem that majority voting 
attempts to address: the imbalance of power between shareholders and 
directors in director elections. Even presuming that the new rules and laws 
will generally prevent directors from breaching their fiduciary duties, 
“‘[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which 
the legitimacy of directorial power rests,’”306 and therefore shareholders 
should have a meaningful say in the director-election process. 
 
 
 300. See supra text accompanying notes 123–24. 
 301. See supra text accompanying notes 213–20. 
 302. See supra text accompanying notes 147–50. 
 303. See, e.g., Keith Paul Bishop, Majority Voting Could Harm Shareholder Interests, L.A. DAILY 
JOURNAL, May 11, 2006, available at http://www.buchalter.com/CM/Publications/051106-Majority-
Voting-Could-Harm-Shareholder-Interests.pdf. 
 304. Perhaps an additional argument warns of the possible “unintended consequences” of majority 
voting. The only concrete examples of such consequences that opponents provide are, first, the 
possibility that the contemplated changes to the NYSE broker nonvote rule might cause directors to 
receive fewer “for” votes than previously and thus cause failed elections more frequently than 
warranted, and, second, that majority voting will impede the movement to declassify boards. See supra 
notes 241–46, 260–63. As to the first, it could be argued that eliminating such uninstructed votes from 
the count makes elections more democratic. See ISS Letter, supra note 281, at 6–7. Further, the 
widespread adoption of majority voting may compel the NYSE to leave the broker nonvote rule as is. 
As to the second, the trend toward board declassification has continued to remain strong, and, in any 
event, a board’s attempts to “reclassify” the board itself will “require the approval of shareholders.” Id. 
at 5. 
 305. See supra text accompanying notes 250–63. 
 306. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1998) (emphasis added). 
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The second argument against majority voting represents a more valid 
concern—that the switch from a plurality- to majority-voting standard 
presents daunting (and assertedly unanswerable) questions of 
implementation.307 Though it certainly does raise questions of 
implementation, majority voting can be, and has been, implemented in 
many large, successful publicly traded corporations.308 The three primary 
issues surrounding the implementation of majority voting are: (1) whether 
the state legislatures should mandate a majority-voting standard for 
director elections or at least provide that majority voting would be the 
default standard; (2) what kind of standard should ultimately be applied 
(e.g., a Pfizer- or Intel-styled standard); and (3) whether state holdover 
rules should be abolished or limited in order to make majority voting 
meaningful, or whether they can be retained as they stand.309 Each of these 
issues is addressable.  
First, although majority voting is a positive step in corporate-
governance reform, it is not clear that the state legislatures need to step in 
to force the standard upon companies or even make majority voting the 
default voting standard.310 The better option is to permit shareholders to 
move for the adoption of a majority-voting standard at their company in 
the first instance.311 The majority-voting movement as it has already 
unfolded indicates that shareholders likely will not face significant 
opposition in at least getting the bylaw-amendment proposals (to require 
majority voting) on the company’s proxy statement. The SEC has refused 
to issue no-action letters that would otherwise allow the company to 
exclude such proposals.312 In addition, even to the extent that the 
shareholder proposals receive substantial support but do not pass,313 
 
 
 307. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 273–74. 
 308. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 309. Compare CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 31 (endorsing majority voting but 
also calling for the “continued application of the holdover director rule[s]”), with ISS Letter, supra 
note 281, at 4–5 (arguing that the sweep of the holdover rule should be significantly reduced). 
 310. Plurality voting is the default in the majority of the states. See supra note 121. 
 311. See ABA Press Release, supra note 172, at 3 (stating that it would be “unwise to change the 
statutory plurality default rule because it would apply universally to all corporations governed [by the 
MBCA]” and that, instead of legislatively making plurality voting the default rule, “the statutory 
framework should facilitate individual corporate action”) (emphasis added). 
 312. See supra note 146. 
 313. If the proposal does pass, and the proposal calls for a binding bylaw amendment, the 
directors are not free to ignore it, as amendments to the bylaws pertaining to director elections are 
within the province of shareholder voting power under state corporate law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 109(a) (2006) (shareholders may “adopt, amend or repeal bylaws”); § 109(b) (bylaws may contain 
any provision “relating to . . . the rights or powers of [the company’s] stockholders”). If the directors 
refuse to adopt or implement the policy or otherwise ignore its mandate, it appears that they would be 
violating section 109 of DGCL. See § 109. 
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companies may have little choice but to accommodate shareholders in 
some manner (whether by adoption of a true majority-voting standard or a 
director-resignation policy) as the tide turns toward universal majority 
voting.314 If an unbending company finds itself as one of the only 
companies resisting the majority-voting trend, dissatisfied shareholders 
may sell the company’s stock,315 or institutional shareholders, at the urging 
of the proxy advisory services, may well undertake proxy contests to 
displace resistant boards.316 
On the other hand, if the shareholders of a corporation are content with 
the plurality-voting system, they should be allowed to retain that standard. 
Shareholders and their companies are fully capable of weighing the risk of 
failed elections or sudden vacancies317 against the value of increased 
participation in the election of directors—all inherent in the majority-
voting standard. If the shareholders and the company decide that the 
benefits outweigh the costs, that company can implement majority voting. 
However, those companies that do not want to take the time or spend the 
money to undertake this calculus should be able to default to plurality 
voting. Therefore, state laws should not be amended insofar as they 
require majority voting or make it the default standard, even though the 
advantages of majority voting appear, on balance, to outweigh the 
disadvantages.  
If shareholders or their companies decide that majority voting is 
desirable, the question then becomes what kind of standard to adopt: 
specifically, is a Pfizer-type standard sufficient, or must shareholders push 
for an Intel-type standard? First, as noted above, there is not a great deal of 
difference between the Pfizer (modified plurality) and Intel (“true 
majority”) standard.318 Under either standard, even if a director fails to 
receive a majority of affirmative votes, the director stays on the board, and 
 
 
 314. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 315. Massive selling might create a depression in the stock price and make the company more 
susceptible to takeover, in which case the resisting management would be promptly displaced. See 
supra text accompanying notes 64–65. Even though the board may employ antitakeover defenses, the 
business judgment rule will not protect their decisions if they are not made in good faith. See supra 
note 59. 
 316. See CII-NACD REPORT, supra note 48, app. B at 29 (noting that “[p]roxy advisory services 
. . . are increasingly playing a decisive role in shareholder voting” and that “[o]ften, these services vote 
or influence the vote of substantial blocks of institutionally owned shares of major companies”). In 
addition, though proxy contests are expensive, it does not seem unreasonable to require shareholders to 
conduct a contest in this one particular (and unlikely) instance in order to install a board that will be 
amenable to changing the voting standard to majority voting, as such a change should reduce the 
likelihood of shareholders’ having to conduct proxy contests in the future. 
 317. See supra text accompanying notes 286–87. 
 318. See supra note 283. 
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the board cannot remove that director unless he submits a resignation.319 
And under both standards the board retains the discretion to decide 
whether to accept the director’s resignation, thereby allowing the board to 
evaluate the impact that the director’s departure would have on the 
functioning of the board.320 Both the Pfizer and Intel standards, therefore, 
give the shareholders’ withhold or “against” votes some significance. A 
director’s receipt of a majority of withhold or against votes triggers board 
deliberation with respect to that director under both standards.  
Despite its similarity to Pfizer’s approach, however, Intel’s standard 
seems preferable for two primary reasons. First, only the Intel approach 
entails a binding bylaw amendment, which mandates that directors who 
fail to receive the requisite vote are not elected.321 In addition, recent 
amendments to state corporate laws provide that the board may not amend 
or repeal bylaws that “specif[y] the votes that shall be necessary for the 
election of directors.”322 By contrast, the board may amend a policy at any 
time.323  
The second reason the Intel approach is preferable is that it actually 
changes the voting standard for the election of directors.324 Even though 
there may be little practical difference between an elected director having 
received a majority of withheld votes and an unelected, holdover director 
having received a majority of “against” votes,325 there is a stronger “‘legal’ 
. . . and . . . moral effect” associated with the latter director’s actual failure 
to be elected.326 In the case of an unelected director who holds over, the 
board may be forced to offer a more compelling justification for retaining 
such a director—who was expressly unelected by the shareholders—in the 
face of the shareholders’ clear vote for the board to do the opposite.327  
 
 
 319. See supra note 282. 
 320. See supra text accompanying note 283. 
 321. See supra notes 271–72 and accompanying text. Though some companies that have adopted 
modified plurality approaches have incorporated the resignation policy into the bylaws, they appear to 
be in the minority. COGUT ET AL., supra note 121, at 4–5 (describing General Electric’s and Time 
Warner’s approaches). 
 322. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006); cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22(c)(1). 
 323. See supra text accompanying note 271. It would appear that the amendment to section 216 of 
the DGCL might not even apply to a bylaw incorporating a director-resignation policy in any event, 
since such a policy, while related to voting in director elections, still does not “specif[y] the votes that 
shall be necessary for the election of directors,” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006) (emphasis 
added). In merely specifying the number of votes necessary to trigger deliberation with respect to the 
director’s resignation, the policy fails to “specif[y] the votes” required to elect a director, as nominees 
under plurality voting are still elected by a single vote. See id.; see also supra note 158. 
 324. See supra note 158. 
 325. See supra note 283. 
 326. Nathan, supra note 158, at 2.  
 327. See id.  
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The final implementation issue regarding majority voting extends to 
the operation of the states’ holdover rules. Opponents argue that majority 
voting is really no different than plurality voting if the director holds over 
notwithstanding the shareholders’ vote.328 Even some proponents of 
majority voting have argued similarly; though majority voting is a positive 
and necessary development to give shareholders more leverage in director 
elections, proponents state that the holdover rules prevent majority voting 
from doing so to its fullest extent.329 The obvious question that arises, 
then, is whether states should discard the holdover rules in order to 
implement majority voting. Upon deliberation, the answer appears to be 
“no.” Though it is true that the holdover rules do, to a degree, dilute the 
shareholders’ power to “un-elect” directors, the rules are necessary in light 
of the disabling consequences that could ensue if unelected directors were 
immediately removed from the board.330 Among other things, corporations 
would face delisting from stock exchanges, expensive severance payments 
for those insider directors whose compensation packages provide for them, 
and exposure to potentially harmful takeovers.331  
Even though the holdover rules are necessary, there is a strong 
argument for reforming them so as to ensure that shareholders actually 
realize the benefits majority voting seeks to confer. The holdover rules as 
they currently stand allow for an unelected director to hold over 
indefinitely since, absent resignation or removal, directors hold over “until 
[their] successor[s] [are] elected and qualified.”332 Thus, there appears to 
 
 
 328. See supra note 236. 
 329. See ISS Letter, supra note 281, at 4–5. 
 330. See supra note 232 (describing some of the adverse consequences). Some opponents also 
argue that the majority-voting standard may actually put shareholders in a worse position, since the 
board may decide to accept a director’s resignation, thereby creating a vacancy that the board itself can 
fill. Bishop, supra note 303, at 2. However, this is not a strong argument against majority voting. First, 
the bylaws (or the charter) can provide shareholders with the power to fill vacancies, DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 223(a) (2006) (allowing the charter or bylaws to change the default rule that the directors fill 
vacancies), and the shareholders may always adopt a bylaw allowing them to do so, §§ 109(a), 
§ 223(a). Second, even to the extent that the board can unilaterally fill the vacancy, majority voting is 
concerned with giving effect to shareholders’ votes against unsatisfactory directors; it is not focused, 
as the Proposed Rule was, on giving shareholders the power to nominate directors. See supra text 
accompanying note 205. The board can unilaterally nominate its own replacement candidate at the 
next election anyway under either a majority- or plurality-voting standard, so its ability to do so before 
the election does not seem especially troubling. Shareholders may always vote against that director at 
the next annual meeting in any case. See supra note 101. 
 331. See supra note 232. 
 332. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2006); cf. Fork Bancorporation, Inc. v. Toal, 825 A.2d 860, 
871 & n.25 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holdover directors under majority-voting standard on a classified board 
were required to sit for election at the next meeting following their failure to be elected rather than 
being allowed to hold over for the rest of their three-year term; court never stated, however, that the 
holdover directors would abdicate their positions if they did not win at the next election). In theory, 
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be no cutoff period. For this reason, the state legislatures should consider 
limiting the holdover period to a certain timeframe.333 A holdover period 
ending on the date of the next annual meeting would be reasonable and 
appropriate, since by that time a board should be able to find a qualified 
director.334  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The control structure of the public corporation is such that the board of 
directors maintains nearly complete control over the management of the 
corporation. Such discretion is appropriate because in large, publicly 
traded corporations, it is infeasible that millions of dispersed shareholders 
could come together to manage “the business and affairs of . . . [the] 
corporation.”335 But majority voting does not attempt to change the control 
structure of the corporation. It does not result in shareholders dictating the 
decisions that directors will make.336 All majority voting does is provide 
shareholders a more meaningful role in voting in director elections—a key 
right that shareholders have always possessed.337 In the end, majority 
voting is really a modest proposal designed to reenfranchise shareholders. 
 
 
then, even under a majority-voting standard, the board could reject an unelected director’s resignation, 
allowing him to hold over, then renominate him for the next election and continue to do so 
indefinitely; all the while, the director could hold over until his “successor [was] elected and 
qualified.” See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b).  
 333. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22 (2006). The newly enacted section 10.22 of the MBCA 
effectively allows the corporation to limit the holdover period to ninety days. See id. The problem with 
this holdover period, however, is that the time it allows the corporation to find a replacement director 
may be insufficient, and it leaves the board no flexibility, for even if the board cannot find a 
replacement in time, the director receiving a majority of withhold votes is unseated after ninety days, 
producing a vacancy. See id. 
 334. See Comac Partners, L.P. v. Ghaznavi, 793 A.2d 372, 379–80 (Del. Ch. 2001) (stressing the 
importance of the election of directors at an annual meeting). If the board believes that it is in the best 
interest of the corporation for the holdover director to continue to serve beyond the next annual 
election, the board may renominate that director but should have another director in queue in case the 
shareholders vote against the holdover director again. 
 Perhaps an even better solution would be to allow individual companies wishing to prevent or 
limit the application of the holdover rule to do so in their charters, as the MBCA (as amended) 
currently allows. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.05(e). Such a change would allow companies to 
assess on an individual basis how long it would take to find a replacement director when one fails to be 
elected at a meeting. If the legislatures are concerned that companies may eliminate the holdover 
period entirely, they could also mandate a minimum holdover period, such as ninety days (which could 
still be cut off by director resignations).  
 335. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 5–6. 
 336. In fact, majority voting is unlikely to affect in any capacity companies that maintain cordial 
relationships with their shareholders. Such companies respond actively to shareholder dissatisfaction 
by keeping open lines of communication between the board and the shareholders. See supra note 220 
and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
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It represents a happy medium between the problematic Shareholder 
Access Proposal and the alternative of giving shareholders only nominal 
say in board elections.338  
Further, as demonstrated above, implementation problems cited by 
opponents are addressable. In the end, those companies planning to resist 
the rising tide of majority voting would be well advised to reconsider such 




 338. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1467 (2006).  
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